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ABSTRACT 
The popular uprisings in Syria, which marked the beginning of the current crisis in 
March 2011, caused instability throughout the region. In addition to the regional 
and non-regional powers involved to varying degrees, the theater of conflict in Syria 
has seen Iran taking to the stage with an increasingly active role. Iran was initially 
vocal in support of the spread of popular Arab uprisings across the Arab world and 
was swift in hailing them as “Islamic Awakenings,” but as Syria’s civil war 
threatened a forty-year-old Syrian-Iranian Alliance. This thesis is, therefore, an 
attempt to shed light on the way in which Iranian policy towards the Syrian War 
has been fueled by a pragmatic position, from the year 2011 to the year 2017. The 
thesis also analyzes the impact that the civil war in Syria has had on Iranian politics 
by taking a look into the matter from both the hardliner’s perspective and that of 
the liberal reformists. What will be demonstrated, the recent events indicate that the 
empowerment of the Hardliners and IRGC all this shows that the Syrian crisis 
became a watershed movement and it had a great impact on the internal political 
power configuration of Iran. It completely changed the tide of power against the 
reformist’s camp although they had two consecutive electoral victories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 viii 
 
ÖZET 
Suriye'deki halk ayaklanmaları Mart 2011'de, mevcut krizin başlangıcını belirledi  
ve bölge genelinde istikrarsızlığa neden oldu. Çeşitli derecelerde yer alan bölgesel 
ve bölgesel olmayan güçlere ek olarak, Suriye'deki çatışma tiyatrosu, İran'ın daha 
aktif bir rol üstlenerek sahneye çıktığını gördü. İran başlangıçta Arap 
ayaklanmalarının Arap dünyasına yayılmasını destekleme noktasında sesini 
çıkarmaktan çekinmedi ve onları “İslami Uyanışlar” olarak görmekte hızlıydı, 
ancak Suriye’nin iç savaşı kırk yıllık bir Suriye-İran İttifakını tehlikeye düşürdü. 
Bu tez, bu nedenle, 2011’den 2017 yılına kadar İran’ın Suriye Savaşı’na yönelik 
politikasının pragmatik bir tutumla nasıl tetiklendiğine ışık tutmaya çalışmaktadır. 
Bu tez aynı zamanda Suriye'deki iç savaşın, konuyu hem sertlik yanlılarının 
perspektifinden hem de liberal reformistlerin bakış açısıyla inceleyerek, İran 
politikaları üzerindeki etkisini analiz etmektedir. Bu Makalede gösterilecek olan, 
son olayların, sertlik yanlıları ve İran Devrim Muhafızları Ordusu'nun 
güçlendirilmesinin, tüm bunların Suriye krizinin bir dönüm noktası hareketi 
olduğunu ve İran'ın iç politik güç yapılandırması üzerinde büyük bir etkisi 
olduğunu belirtmesidir. Bu, iki ardışık seçim zaferine rağmen, reformist kampına 
karşı güç istikametini tamamen değiştirmiştir.
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INTRODUCTION 
Iran has stubbornly held on to the position of being side by side in support 
of the Bashar al-Assad government, during the whole of the Syrian crisis. The 
ability of Iran’s alliance with next door Syria to survive is significant, as the 
partnership is founded much more on a tactical basis than any shared religious or 
cultural one.  
When it seemed that the uprisings that later became known as the Arab 
Spring were only in opposition to Western-backed regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Yemen, Syria announced them as glorious revolutions to throw off the chains of the 
oppressors. Iran did not sing the same tune about the uprisings in Syria, claiming 
the opposition to the Assad regime were “terrorists” supported by a bunch of Gulf 
Arab states, Israel and the United States. The fact is that if Iran had not provided 
both military and monetary aid, the regime in Damascus would be long gone. 
The violent events of 2011 in Syria rippled in Tehran and triggered a new 
chapter of the saga in the history of Iranian - Syrian relationships, testing to the 
limit a bond of over four decades. The desire of the leadership in Damascus and 
Tehran to collaborate on foreign policy is driven by a shared need to preserve their 
power in the region. Maintaining territorial integrity and national security is, 
therefore, paramount. There has been a shared perception of threat from the two 
countries and also a shared perception of benefits in the case of both nations’ 
interests in Lebanon and Iraq and also in championing the Palestine resistance. It is 
by means of mutual economic and political assistance that the Iranian – Syrian 
marriage of convenience thieves. The joint tactic of gathering and supporting a 
network of surrogate militias, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, has made this alliance 
a formidable thorn in the side of their opponents. With minor differences in 
ideological matter and religious standpoints and common goals, they have been able 
to successfully impose their position on the regional chessboard. Therefore, in this 
chapter can be found an in-depth exploration of all the relevant historical phases 
that shaped the alliance between Syria and Iran by providing a theoretical 
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framework. To properly analyze the historical events that forged the Iran-Syria 
alliance, the different periods will be considered in the following way.   
The second chapter is a look into Iran’s response to the Arab revolutions 
from its view that these narratives can be encompassed within a glorious Iranian 
vision, based on Iran’s influence in the Islamic world and its future. Then Iran’s 
initial enthusiasm about the Arab revolutions of Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen faded 
out. In Libya, Iran’s optimism was deflated after the NATO military intervention. 
Iran continued to declare Bahrain’s as a “genuine revolution backed by divine 
power” But as we see when it came to Syria, Iran’s position took a stark U-turn and 
it proceeded to denounce the Syrian revolution claiming that it was a Zionist plot 
of the west. This chapter shows that Iran’s rhetoric on the Syrian revolution has 
been brief, abstracted, and almost blasé toward the victims of the conflict. 
In this chapter, I also put forward my argument about how the initial 
problem referred to as the Syrian peaceful protests, evolved way beyond the 
problem of any one state and escalated into a regional proxy war and then became 
the complex scene of proxy wars of several powerful nations. In this context, the 
dynamics of the crisis in Syria were then diversified. The civil war dynamics 
already inside Syria included sectarian clashes and were to play a part in the 
geopolitical rivalry between the regional and global powers that participated in the 
civil war, manipulating and exploiting the situation as proxies. To highlight this, 
the ultimate aim of the chapter in the first stage is to show all the elements and 
surrounding context that prompted the original peaceful protests in Syria and in the 
second stage the chapter will provide an account of the internal, regional and 
international dimensions of the crisis. 
 The third chapter examines the approach adopted by Iran toward the 
Syrian civil war between 2011 and 2017, by addressing the question:  How has 
Iranian policy gradually changed in accordance with the new developments in 
Syria? The research is aimed at the initial drivers of Iran’s policy on the Syria 
conflict, by contextualizing its involvement through four separate motivations. In 
this manner, the chapter strives to give an explanation of Iran’s activity in Syria, 
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through a pragmatic position by dealing with how the Iranian regime has developed 
a narrative of official foreign policy on Syria throughout the different phases of the 
war in Syria.  
Meanwhile, this chapter also gives a thorough explanation to Iran’s multilayered 
strategy will be analyzed in this chapter, which includes an extensive, expensive, 
and coordinated effort. The chapter shows how the assistance and aid to Syria 
gradually increased and took different forms over the various stages of the Syrian 
crisis from 2011, 2012, and later in September 2015.  
In the last chapter, I have tried to show how both rivaling sides of the 
hardliners and the reformers approach the policy in Syria and also details the 
process of how the developments in Syria affected politics in Iran in a manner 
which gave the hardliners the edge. In the chapter also, what will be gone into is 
the relevant context and progression of Tehran’s policy on Syria and its ever-
worsening war, firstly by providing some information about the relationship 
between previous president Ahmadinejad and the Assad regime and then on to the 
current President, Hassan Rouhani and how he has managed the Syrian crisis. It 
will be explained that despite reformists coming out on top in two consecutive 
elections, their efforts in relation to foreign policy on Syria were quashed by the 
hardliners.  
The purpose of this thesis is to give an account of Iranian foreign policy towards 
the Syrian civil war between 2011- 2017 and reveal its impact on the IR political 
power configuration, in order to thoroughly clarify the matter at hand, the thesis 
will examine the major hypothesis put forward as in the following way.  
I. Expansion of Iran-Syria relations caused by common Geopolitical and 
Geostrategic interests in the region. 
II. The Deposition of Shah’s government by Ayatollah Rohullah Ali Khomeini 
in 1979, has been one of the factors contributing to the expansion of political 
relations between Iran and Syria 
III. Anti-Western-Israeli rhetoric and alignment of strategic goals have 
consolidated the axis of Iranian-Syrian relations.  
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IV. The Syrian crisis caused a significant impact on the Iranian politics. The 
crisis changed the power configuration in Iran.  
V. With the ongoing crisis, the hardliners improved their stance and 
consolidated their position within the state.  
VI. Reformists camp, even though winning two consecutive elections, failed to 
change the hardliners Syria’s policy. 
With regard to the research methodology and material used, this thesis is based on 
qualitative research techniques, and it relies primarily on secondary sources (books, 
Journals, Article), along with documents and Iranian officials and government 
statements. As regards the sources, one of the strengths of this thesis is that the 
original sources in Persian have been extensively used. The study has also some 
potentials limitations that need to be shed light on. First of all, during my research 
I had a lot of difficulties in finding authentic Persian sources. Although I have tried 
to avoid using biased Persian sources in my thesis. As matter of fact, Iran is a 
country where no one would dare to question regime polices, and where most of 
the sources published online are either biased or very limited. therefore, I 
encountered a great deal of difficulties throughout my research finding authentic 
sources. But however, for the sake of my research originality, I contacted Iranian 
academicians in and outside of Iran both from the reformists camp and that of the 
hardliners who were really helpful and meanwhile I also looked at to the matter 
from both the hardliners and reformists perspectives by compare and contrasting 
both of their views over Iranian policy towards Syria.     
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Chapter I 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
1. Conceptual Framework for The Alliance Formation 
 When discussing an alliance between two nations, it is commonly 
understood to mean “an alliance is a formal or informal arrangement for security 
cooperation between two or more sovereign states”1 And one whereby all parties 
envisage benefits for their own interests in the realms of political, diplomatic and 
economic influence. In the field of international relations, alliances between various 
influential nations, how and why they are set up and what the particular strategies 
and benefits are, is one of the key elements to be discussed and understood. It may 
be no surprise that there is a large body of literature on alliances in the world of 
academia. The origin of alliances is one of the top debated subjects for those 
studying international relations. In relation to why states may establish an alliance, 
it comes down to the number one concern for any nation-state which is its national 
security and as studies show it is to seek to ensure protection from a perceived 
outside threat that alliances are mainly formed. If the threat is from within the 
country, then it is understood that it is normally smaller and less powerful 
developing states making moves to strengthen their grip on a local level, as a pose 
to larger powerful world players, who make alliances to conserve their power. 
These two are the main approaches in the vast majority of studies looking into the 
cause of political alliances. Other than this, there are a certain number of other 
scholars who also focus on cultural similarities as a key factor to be considered in 
the forming of alliances.2 
 The assumption that nations seek alliances with other nations for the interest 
of their national security is prevalent in the literature dominated by realist and 
neorealist approaches. International relations being the arena of battling states, all 
                                                          
1 Walt, S.M., 1990. The origins of alliance. Cornell University Press. pp.12 
2 Walt, S.M., 1985. Alliance formation and the balance of world power. International 
security, 9(4), pp.3-43 
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seeking to maximize their own power and benefit, is the view of classical realism 
and tends also to bring human nature to the focus. The assumption of this 
framework is that of a more open playing field, a rationally unified body of actors 
and everyone fighting to come out on top, with states acting out their policies on 
the global stage and calculating their moves and rationally weighing up the cost. 
Whereas neorealism posits a more uneven playing field. According to this model, 
states are restricted by the structure of the anarchic international system in which 
lesser powerful nations make alliances with other less powerful ones to try to offset 
the balance of power because power is inherently distributed unequally.3 
 Along these lines, Waltz. (2010), declares that nation-states make alliances 
because of imbalance and hegemony. He believes that the international system is 
anarchic, and so, countries struggle to get the largest slice of power they can. 
According to him, the alliances of weaker states in response to the threat of larger 
states are simply the inevitable counterbalance caused by the initial imbalance of 
power in the world. He insists on this balancing behavior of weaker states in his 
BOP theory. So as far as Waltz is concerned the key to understanding the origin of 
alliances is to look at the balancing behavior of weak countries, in response to 
strong ones. Indeed, it can be seen from history that every time a nation has 
dominant, there has been a counter force of allegiances, such as in the case of the 
whole of Europe uniting against the Nazis of Germany from 1933-1945.4 
 In neorealist theory, we find that states are seen as entirely rational actors 
simply asserting a push to maximize their own interest and make more defensive 
kind of alliances based on that and not in order to join the side of the dominant 
power of the day or ‘’bandwagoning’’. (Mearsheimer, 2009, Shadunts(2016) Liska 
(1962), Morgenthau (1960), Waltz (1979) are all related to the school of the BOP. 
                                                          
3 Keohane, R.O., 1986. Neorealism and its Critics. Columbia University Press for further 
information, Waltz book could be checked. Waltz, K.N., 2010. Theory of international politics. 
Waveland Press. 204-209 
4 Waltz, K.N., 2010. Theory of international politics, Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press. Pp:103-
132 
 7 
 
Most traditional literature falls within the BOP (balance of power) theory.5,6 
 Even though the BOP theory has become such a dominant approach, some 
questions exist about the soundness of this theory. The idea of smaller developing 
nations seeking alliances to strengthen them against big threatening nations has 
actually been challenged a lot by various scholars. Amongst those who contest this 
theory are scholars who hold to another view named, utility theory. In utility theory, 
a state simply forms alliances based on utility, so it maybe to jump on the 
bandwagon or it may be to balance the power, it just depends on what it determines 
is more useful to it. David Newman (1982) as a supporter of this view, mentions 
that the more dominant and influential states are more likely to establish alliances 
than the smaller ones and therefore does not accept the neorealist BOP theory that 
the weaker states form alliances as a counter against the stronger ones (Walt, S.M., 
1990).7 
 Following the same line of thought is Brian Healey and Arthur Stein who 
oppose the BOP thesis of the neorealist and suggest that bandwagoning is the 
prevalent impulse of states who seek to find partners to bolster their position, rather 
than making an alliance of the weak to stand up to the tyrant. Brian Healey and 
Arthur Stein point out that the alliance from 1870-1881was entirely the result of 
bandwagoning and not as a result of BOP or balancing.8  
 In the contrasting perspective, we have Stephen M. Walt, who had some 
adjustments of the neorealist view put the emphasis on threat rather than power in 
explaining the motives for international alliances. He followed the neorealist theory 
in regard to the anarchic nature of the international system and balance of power to 
a large degree, but he asserted that nation-states do not really make alliances against 
the strongest states but the most threatening. For him, “An alliance is a formal or 
informal commitment for security cooperation between two or more states, 
                                                          
5 Mearsheimer, J.J., 2009. Reckless States and Realism. International Relations, 23(2), pp.241 
6 Shadunts,Alen, The Rational Actor Assumption in Structural Realism. E-International Relations. 
Available at: http://www.e-ir.info/2016/10/28/the-rational-actor-assumption-in-structural-realism/ 
7 Walt, S.M., 1990. The Origins of Alliance, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Pp:9 
8 Ibid page 8 
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intended to augment each member’s power, security, and influence.” The key factor 
for him is the “commitment for mutual support against some external actors.” So, 
he is saying that states choose allies not to balance the power but to balance the 
threat. Therefore Stephen M. Walt redefines the theory of the neorealist from the 
balance of power to “balance of threat.” In this way, a nation is not merely 
considered a threat because of its size and power but because of its geographical 
proximity, intentions it is believed to have, perhaps a conflicting agenda is 
perceived threatening. In Walt’s theory, alliances may also be made on the basis of 
how states choose sides in a conflict, either by balancing or bandwagoning. Walt 
defines balancing as “allying with others against a prevailing threat,” and 
bandwagoning as the “alignment with the source of danger.”9  
 Walt puts forward that both defensive and offensive reasons can drive 
bandwagoning. Defensively to appease the dominant power and offensively to 
profit, directly or indirectly, from the victory of the dominant power. It can also be 
a combination of both reasons. Walt strongly suggests that balancing is, empirically, 
the main response we can observe in response to external threats and bandwagoning 
is virtually always carried out by weak and isolated developing nations. 
Bandwagoning is risky as it suggests trusting the dominant power and also serves 
as an increase in their resources and as is often the case, today’s friend can be 
tomorrow’s enemy. Joining the weaker side entails obstructing the emergence of 
the prevailing hegemony that can be a threat to everyone. 
 Ideology can form another factor in an alliance between nations. "Ideological 
solidarity" Hans Morgenthau's phrase, denotes those alliances that result from states 
sharing the same political, ideological and cultural features. This theory is that of 
similarity being the key motive, so the more similar the two nations are, the more 
chance that they will seek an alliance.10 It follows that you trust whoever thinks like 
you and looks like you, but however, this is considered by most as not the main 
                                                          
9 Ibid page 12-18 
10 Walt, S.M., 1985. Alliance formation and the balance of world power. International 
security, 9(4), pp.18-20 
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reason for states to make alliances with one another. In the complex shifting world 
of international relations, the role of ideology is not actually seen as the major factor 
in alliances as far as the numerous studies suggest that ideology may play an 
important role but to some limited extent. Ideology such as in the case of Soviet- 
Poland, communism as an ideology did not explain Soviet-Polish relations, nor the 
history of the Sino-Soviet relations.11  
A shared ideology may sometimes help an alliance but can often ideologies 
do more harm than good and simply generate more conflict than cooperation among 
those involved. In many cases an ideology calls adherent to follow a centralized 
hierarchy or a single supreme leadership, who alone claims the ultimate right to 
articulate what their ideology is and how it must be followed, then in such cases, 
conflict is virtually inevitable.  
Firstly, an ideology is a source of legitimacy for each member of an alliance, 
and they assert a jointly held belief in their ideology being generally valid. 
However, when the ideology then requires a single leader, then all states or in the 
alliances will face being subservient to the one that assumes the leadership position.  
Secondly, this situation creates endless argumentation amongst its members 
because the dominant one acquires dominance by asserting their interpretation of 
the ideology, then all the others will challenge that interpretation in a bid to gain 
supremacy over the others, and this can get serious as they become rivals, declaring 
the others as heretics.12  
 Stephen Walt in his book “The origins of Alliances” also argues that (1985), 
usually once nation states gain a level of strength and security, they follow their 
ideological preferences but when in danger they tend to accept whatever ally they 
can get if it will mean a way out of that current danger. As was seen in the 1920s, 
when Germany's weakness allowed for Britain, along with the United States and 
her European allies to treat the Soviet Union with disdain, this was based largely 
on ideology and echoed back by the Soviets. Once the Nazis began to rise in 
                                                          
11 Ibid: Walt, S.M., 1985. Alliance formation and the balance of world power 
12 Ibid see page 20-22 
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strength and become a real threat, the ideological preferences lost all their impact.13 
In other words, security concerns take priority over ideologies and ideologically 
based alliances are unlikely to survive when more directly dangerous events take 
place.  
This is why Walt indicates that ideology actually has a limited role in 
establishing alliances and its role is often exaggerated to various degrees based on 
the nature of the particular ideology, and that ideological parallels may end up in 
disputation. While it cannot be ignored, it should not, however, be seen as the main 
reason behind an alliance of two or more states. Common ideologies have even 
shown to be problematic and cause significant hurdles for a durable alliance, as 
each nation involved tends to see itself as the prime authority in regards to its own 
understanding and requires the others to surrender their rights and sovereignty in 
order to produce a united bloc of States, who can act harmoniously as one.       
 Therefore, threats to a nation’s security from the outside appear to be the 
major factor when establishing alliances. As most of the theorist center, their 
arguments and hypothesis on the external threat for the formation of Alliance. While 
on the other hand other theorists such as, Steven R. David (1991), who according 
to his theory “Omni Balancing” argues that along with the external threats internal 
threats have to be also taken into consideration. According to Steven David, the 
balance of power theory certainly provides a lot of clarity, when it comes to 
accounting for Third World alignment, it does not quite manage to give a 
satisfactory explanation. With Third World alignment behavior, it is more relevant 
to be seen in terms of rational strategizing of Third World leaders, maneuvering 
according to who on the world stage, is expected to do what is necessary to sustain 
them in power. The core point behind the balance of power theory is pretty much 
undeniable: leaders of Third World nations, as well as leaders of other nations, seek 
to form alliances in order to combat the threats they face.  
Overall according to the assumptions regarding the strength of an alliance 
                                                          
13 Walt, S.M., 1990. Origins of Alliance, Cornell University Press. Page: 21-22 
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and its capacity to withstand the test of the time believed to due to strategic and 
political considerations, with the sharing of enemies and threat-balancing being the 
main factors at work. It did originate as an answer to seriously threatening invasions 
by enemy powers. As Iran’s certainly required the help of Syria’s during the Iraqi 
invasion and Syria’s need for Iranian assistance against Israel when they proceeded 
to the invasion of Lebanon, and this mutual assistance builds the bonds of a strong 
and lasting alliance. As realist theory puts it, the imbalance of power that exists in 
the international arena always invites counterbalancing alliances. The outcome is 
also in line with the realist view that relies on power balancing to push back the 
biggest states and therefore, promotes balance and stability. The alliance had a clear 
balancing effect on the Israeli-American coalition in Lebanon during the time of 
the 1982 Israeli invasion and the pro-Iraq alliance of the Iran-Iraq conflict; in both 
examples mentioned, the revisionist (Israeli, Iraqi) agenda was halted in virtually 
the exact way that balancing theory explains. We may say that the aims of Syria and 
especially of Iran are revisionist in nature and also represent defensive moves, 
because of their balancing states with at least equally revisionist outlooks, the Iran-
Syria relationship has basically supported the regional’s status quo. This alliance 
has always had a core feature of countering the power of Iraq and Israel and the 
penetration of the region by western hegemony.14 
It should be also pointed out the geography has also played a part in shaping 
the Iran-Syria alliance and of course, their experiences. With that said, however, the 
influence of a shared ideological view of the world and its effect of the attitudes of 
the rulers of both countries should also not go unnoticed. There is a crossover in 
much of their secular political philosophy, putting them in harmony in relation to 
many of their political views. Iran has often attempted to utilize its own Islamic 
revolutionary ideology to transcend tribalism and promote some form Islamic unity 
across the region by trying to undo age-old Arab-Iranian tensions and to show their 
solidarity with the Arabs in their struggle against Israel. Syria has sought to solve 
                                                          
14 Ehteshami, A. & Hinnebusch, R.A., 1997. Syria and Iran: middle powers in a penetrated 
regional system, London: Routledge., Pp7-24 
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the political disharmony of the Arab world and by offering itself as a tool for 
regenerating Arab unity since Syria sees itself as the birthplace and natural home of 
Arabism. In relation to their alliance, the Middle East has been viewed by Hafez 
Assad, Rohullah Khomeini, and their subsequent successors as a highly strategic 
arena, crucial for the progress of Arab Islamic interests and the increase of 
autonomy from foreign powers. So, therefore, both parties have over time proved 
that they prioritize a long-term agenda to advance their joint goals.15 
Balancing and bandwagoning approaches can be seen in action over the 
course of the Iran-Syria alliance. In the more recent phase of the alliance between 
the two Middle Eastern neighbors, which saw the Syrian uprisings, we can observe 
the Omni balancing theory as being relevant. The Omni balancing theory asserts 
that leaders have to balance both abasing internal and external threats. What could 
be observed from the violent uprisings in Syria fits with the Omni balancing version 
of events. Assad was attempting to hold on to power in the country, while 
surrounded by huge international pressure. Then came Syria’s alliance with Iran as 
an essential pillar of strength and support, without which Assad could not survive. 
The Assad regime’s survival had then become almost entirely in the hands of 
Tehran. So, this is a clear example of a state using an alliance to balance against 
threats on both a domestic and international level.16  
The Middle East is a political hotbed of shifting alliances, and the Iran-Syria 
combination is one most influential and enduring. Events following Iran's so-called 
Islamic revolution in 1979, the alliance has faced many threats throughout the last 
four decades, including the Iran-Iraq War and several popular uprisings. Today the 
alliance is continuing within the context of Syria's harsh and drawn-out civil war; 
it is because both parties find each other on the same page as they see themselves 
as in the front line in the plight to push back against the U.S. and Israel and their 
hegemonic ambitions in the region. So, having shared goals is important when 
                                                          
15 Goodarzi, J.M., 2009 version. Syria and Iran: diplomatic alliance and power politics in the 
Middle East, London: Tauris Academic Studies.Pp. 294 check the version published in 2009. 
16 Coskun, G., 2016. Syria-Iranian Relations during Bashar Al- Assad Period: A Test Case for 
Alliance Theories.  
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attempting to comprehend what is motivation Iran in its involvement in the Syrian 
Civil War. In Iran’s approach on Syria, there is a clearly discernible emphasis on a 
defensive strategy in a bid to maintain and consolidate power. 
All in all, even though Syria’s alliance with Iran may seem unusual to some 
onlookers, the key objective they have in common is neutralizing common enemies 
and threats, so in that sense, the Iranian-Syrian alliance must be understood as more 
of a defensive response to major upheavals taking place in the region. This thesis 
will thus analyze the historical stages behind the Iranian - Syrian alliance in the 
following way.  
 
1.2. Historical Background to the Syrian- Iranian Alliance 
 An enormously robust alliance has always been seen in the two Middle 
Eastern neighbors of Iran and Syria for over thirty years. Their policy has caused 
considerable ripples of opposition within the Middle East and the outside world. 
Both Syria and Iran have a sizeable skepticism of foreign meddling into their 
affairs, and they have side by side charted their way through the shifting balance of 
powers in their region in order to protect their economies. Iran and Syria tend to 
come to the aid of one another in difficult times, and it is clear they have a lot to 
bring them together, not just sharing the same enemies but also sharing much of the 
same religious and political viewpoints. This partnership has been referred to as a 
“marriage of convenience,” and a “strategic alliance,” and it is always stood firm 
through all the turbulence in a volatile region. The Syrian-Iranian alliance has not 
had many in-depth studies conducted, seeking to explain and shed light on it in 
terms of alliance theory, but there are some studies offering a theoretical 
background.  
 Odd couple: Baathist Syria and Khomeini’s Iran (2015) was a paper written 
by Hirschfield and labeled the alliance as the odd couple because, as he sees it, in 
the face of their conflicting political views, they have still managed to hold together. 
Syria is an Arab country with a dominantly secular ruling ideology and Iran, as a 
Persian country has its own distinct culture and also with its strong Shiite identity 
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firmly rooted in its governing ideology. This alliance is inevitably at times, favors 
Iran more than Syrian and at other times vice versa. Hirschfield notes in his paper 
that the reason for the alliance may be understood as the Israeli invasion of Lebanon 
and Iraqi occupation.17 Iran and to a lesser degree, Egypt’s betrayal following the 
Yum Kippur War. Hartfield did state that the moment Saddam is toppled in Iraq, 
the Syrian-Iranian alliance would fall apart, somewhat underestimating the strength 
of their relationship.  
Jubin Goodarzi (2009), also notes that due to the anarchy state of the Middle 
East, there have always been conflicting blocs in the region. Therefore, he calls the 
Syrian Iranian alliance as defensive in nature and assume that it was intended at 
balancing the Iraqi, Israeli threat, and obstructing the US gradual advance in the 
Middle East. Goodarzi, in his article, also proposes a number of reasons that have 
contributed to the longevity and nature of the Syrian Iranian alliance. Although he 
in his paper has thoroughly explained the alliance between the two nations, but there 
are still major informations lacking in his work.18  
 The vast majority of studies carried out on this subject are considerably 
narrow in scope, as they focus purely on the timeline of events that charted the 
history of the alliance and somewhat mentioned some of its underlying reasons and 
nature. None of the studies delve into a thorough examination of the alliance within 
the context of the alliance theory of international relations. Therefore, according to 
the principles of alliance theory, the Iran-Syria relationship will be analyzed in 
depth, following its chronological order in this thesis. The political alliance of Syria 
and Iran was founded immediately after the inception of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran following the famous Iranian revolution of 1979. Since then this alliance has 
survived through the Iran-Iraq War then came popular uprisings and today the 
horrific Syrian civil war in 2011. Through all these turbulent events and challenges 
the relationship has survived, and both nations remain united in resistance to the 
                                                          
17 Hirschfeld, Y., Ma'oz, M. and Yaniv, A., 1986. Syria under Assad: Domestic Constraints and 
Regional Risks. 
18 Goodarzi, J.M., 2013. Syria and Iran: Alliance Cooperation in a Changing Regional 
Environment. Middle Eastern Studies/Ortadogu Etütleri, 4(2). Page 33-52 
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US and Israel, and these uniting factors are crucial to grasp the severity of what at 
present, is at stake for Iran in the Syrian crisis. The Iranian agenda in Syria comes 
out of sharing many of the same views on local issues such as the Palestinian 
situation and the ongoing presence in neighboring Lebanon. Looking to hold their 
position of influence in the Middle East, Iran also can be seen to have a defensive 
mindset as the Syrian conflict has become so enmeshed in a myriad of agendas from 
both state and non-state actors. Prior to revealing the complexities of all the various 
elements concerning Iran’s involvement in Syria, it is time to pause to take a 
methodological note.  
 Firstly, it should be mentioned that the alliance between the two counties, as 
has been stated, has not been subjected to much academic inquiry, even though it 
is one of the longest standings in the region. In this paper, the history of the alliance 
will be focused on in order to shed light on the secret of the alliance’s longevity. 
This chapter aims to address all the relevant historical events over the periods that 
have seen this alliance develop, giving an in-depth analysis and backdrop to the 
Syrian-Iranian cooperative relationship. Revealing a theoretical framework and 
showing the reasons why this particular alliance has managed to weather the storms; 
each period will be considered, respectively. 
1.2.1. The Emergence of the Syrian-Iranian Alliance 
Arab nations lost major territories to Israel, including Sinai, West Bank, and 
East Jerusalem. As a result of the six days war of 1967. In a bid to regain the 
occupied lands, the then Egyptian president, Muhammad Anwar el-Sadat appealed 
to the US for assistance in establishing some kind of peace negotiations with Israel. 
Sadat was rejected from both sides and had been hoping that the US would be 
willing to persuade Israeli to come to the table for talks to restore the status quo of 
the territories. Sadat warned the Americans that if the situation of these occupied 
territories remains, it would eventually escalate into another war. Unfortunately, not 
only was this warning was not listened to, but Sadat then became the target of 
accusations that he was unable out strike against Israel. Since diplomacy had failed, 
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Sadat began to seek alternative solutions, and he set a plan in motion with Syrian 
president Hafiz Al Assad. He managed to persuade him to join him in an attack 
against Israel. Egypt and Syria simultaneously launched a military assault against 
Israel on Yum Kippur, the holiest day in Judaism, October 6th, 1973, which also 
happens to be during the month of Ramadan in which Muslims fast. Syrian troops 
entered the Golan Heights, while those of the Egyptian military made it across the 
Suez Canal and established their positions in the East Bank. At first, the Israelis 
were caught by surprise and severely rattled as they were not prepared and in the 
midst of celebrating their holy day with most of them off duty. The attack initially 
seemed to humiliate Israel, but the conflict ended in disaster with neither side 
coming out on top. Egypt did not succeed in this war, but the Egyptian president 
did manage to earn some esteem throughout the Arab world, which gave him the 
chance to force Israeli to restore the occupied territory of the Sinai Peninsula.19 
Following this conflict with Israel and Egypt’s withdrawal from it in 
October 1973, Cairo restored good relations with Israel and signed a mutual peace 
accord and agreement including the Sinai agreement in 1975, which, left Syria 
exposed to military threats from Israel. The events unfolded to mean that Egypt was 
no longer against Israel and the Syrian offensive serenely weakened, leaving them 
in no way willing to carry the fight against Israel. During the end of March 1977, 
President Anwar Sadat went to Israel, and in September 1978 the Camp David 
accord was signed between Israel and Egypt, which further angered Syria leaving 
Syria with the need to look elsewhere for an alliance. Turning to Syria’s ex-brethren 
from the Baathist party in Iraq, they set up a rejectionist alliance with Iraq to counter 
Israel, which was a daunting task. There was in some degree of success from this 
military alliance in holding the Israeli army within the proper borders on the 
frontlines.20  
                                                          
19 Stephens , E., 2008. Cought on the Hop:The Yom Kippur War. , pp.44–50. 
20 Goodarzi, J.M., 2006. Syria and Iran: diplomatic alliance and power politics in the Middle East, 
London: Tauris Academic Studies. Pp. 16-18 check the version published in 2006. 
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But in a short time, a rift between the two states opened up when Iraq 
accused Damascus of plotting a coup attempt against the Baathist government in 
Baghdad in 1979. Syria denied this, but relations went sour with increasing distrust, 
leaving Damascus even more isolated after a series of setbacks and distrust from its 
Arab neighbors. Therefore, it came as no surprise that Syria focused on 
consolidating relations with Iran just at the time of its newly established 
Revolutionary Government. 
1.2.2. Strengthening of the Syrian-Iranian Alliance-1979 
One of the key events in the history of the modern Middle East was the 1979 
Iranian Revolution. With the despised Pahlavi dynasty toppled, not only were their 
big transformations taking place inside Iran but also in the whole region, it was like 
a new era of political change. The new Iranian government under Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s leadership drastically changed what the world could expect from 
Iranian foreign policy. Pompous, imperial Iran, which had always been kowtowing 
to the west in its foreign policy, had overnight, morphed into a new republic 
claiming a puritanical religious ideology, with vast ambitions to shape and influence 
the politics of the Middle East as a whole.21  
The whole region was in shock at the revolutionary changes sweeping 
across Iran and particularly the Arab world. Many states who had previously 
enjoyed close relations with the imperial regime were now worried and unsure how 
things would go on, and several pro-Soviet governments welcomed the changes 
emphatically. On February 12, 1979, Assad sent a telegram congratulating 
Khomeini for his victory over the Shah. In his telegram, he praised the “Iranian 
people’s victory,” and said: “we proclaim our support for the new regime created 
by the revolution in Iran and the great principles of Islam inspire this regime. The 
creation of this regime is in the Iranian people’s greatest interest, as well as that of 
the Arabs and Muslims.” Fitting as it was, Syria was the first Arab nation to 
congratulate Iran for its revolution, though Libya, Algeria, South Yemen, and the 
                                                          
21 Ibid pp: 11-4 
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PLO also declared their strong support for the new situation unfolding in Tehran.22 
On the other hand, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan were not so vocal 
in support of what had transpired in Iran. Iraq’s foreign minister, after hearing about 
the Iranian revolution simply stated ‘Iran’s internal affairs concern the Iranian 
people only. However, in the winter of 1978/9, the Baathists of Iraq were becoming 
growingly troubled about the changes in Iran taking on fiercely religious rhetoric. 
As Baghdad was all too aware what a Shiite revival could mean for Iraq and how 
much it could be affected by such a situation. When previously Shah’s close ally, 
King Hussein of Jordan had gone on record, stating that Khomeini was a heretic.  
Hafez Assad’s brother, Rifaat, immediately following the revolution, sent 
envoys to Iran in order to hold talks on their alliance and all the various areas in 
which they have a mutual concern, especially in relation to their common enemy of 
Iraq. The Iranian government then responded by a delegation to Syria and held talks 
on how to assist the opposition to Iraq primarily in the Shiite majority south. In 
March, Syria’s minister of information, Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad, met Ayatollah 
Khomeini in the Iranian province of Qom and gave him a gift from Hafez Assad, 
which consisted of a very precious illuminated copy of the Quran and this was the 
first of visit of a senior official to the new revolutionary Iran.23 
Iran and Syria’s bilateral relations fell into place as a tool of assistance for 
both nations right from the inception of the new revolutionized republic of Iran, and 
both nation’s domestic and foreign policies bore striking similarities. The regimes 
in Tehran and Damascus seemed to share an almost identical outlook and 
interpretation of the events that were developing in the region. All this made for a 
fertile ground for their alliance. Iran saw relationships with Arab countries who had 
previously been allies with the previous government deteriorate, such as Morocco, 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. At the same time, those Arab governments and 
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23 Goodarzi, J.M., 2009. Syria and Iran: diplomatic alliance and power politics in the Middle East, 
London: Tauris Academic Studies. Pp. 19-21   
 19 
 
movements that had been opposed to the Shah started to be friendly with Iran. 
Movements, such as Libya’s Muammar Qadhafi and Shiite groups in Iraq and 
Lebanon were now fostering close relations with the newly revolutionized Iran. It 
was to be expected then in early May when Ayatollah Khomeini ordered the cutting 
of diplomatic relations with Egypt “bearing in mind the treacherous treaty between 
Israel and the Egyptian Government’s unreserved obedience to the USA and 
Zionism.”24 
There were very few allies that Syria could place any trust in, early in 1979, 
with Egypt out of the picture, Syria had at first sought to strike up a partnership 
with Iraq. In the winter of 1978, they managed to make some steps towards an 
alliance, but by April 1979, the two factions in the Baath Party could not reconcile 
conflicting visions about what their alliance would entail. When negotiations got 
slower and slower and ended up frozen, the Syrian president started to consider 
other viable alliances, so he then focused on allying with Iran in order to sideline 
Iraq and boost his position among the Gulf nations and further strengthen his 
influence with the Lebanese Shiite community.  
The collapse of attempts at a Syrian–Iraqi alliance came at the same as the 
outbreak of the new Islamic Republic of Iran. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 
actually served to heighten existing tension and obstructed the path to reconciliation 
and Iraq and Syria could be consistently seen as espousing opposing views on key 
topics related to Iran, whether it was about the Shah, Khomeini, Shiite 
fundamentalism or Arab–Iranian relations, Damascus and Baghdad were at 
loggerheads. Syria gave a safe haven to the Shah’s opponents during the ’70s, when 
in Iraq, Khomeini was expelled at the Shah’s request in October 1978. After the 
Iranian revolution, the Assad regime in Syria welcomed the revolution in Iran, but 
Iraq, on the contrary, were concerned about the revolution encouraging its Shiite 
populated southern region to make an uprising against the government.25 
Assad sent a second message of congratulations to Khomeini after a 
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referendum on Iran’s form of government took place. Also, he stated his belief that 
their alliance, on both an official and on a popular level, would continue to flourish 
and prosper. Their rapprochement in the spring and summer of 1979 came as Iran’s 
relationship with Iraq and the Gulf Arab states saw an all-time low. At that time Iran 
was tiring up the Iraqi Shiite population to rebel against their government. Iraq was 
also busy trying many ways to encourage movements on the periphery of Iran that 
called for independence from the Iranian state, such as the Kurdish and Arabs, who 
were demanding autonomy. A large insurrection broke out in late spring from 
Iranian Kurds residing in the oil-rich province of Khuzestan (Arabestan), oil 
installations and government facilities were sabotaged by local resistance groups. 
The Baath Party in Iraq jumped on the chance to fuel the unrest as much as they 
could in order to try to pin down Iranian security forces, and therefore weaken the 
Iranian state to the benefit of their influence in the Gulf.26  
Overall, Syria considered revolutionary Iran a valuable ally in the struggle 
of the Arabs in their resistance against Israel, but Iraq saw the new Iran as a 
significant security threat to the eastern flank Arab world and the sheikhdoms of 
the Gulf States. In 1979/80, the Syria-Iran partnership got stronger, as Iraq was 
withdrawing further away and was starting to build up a more militant posture, 
assuring that tensions between them would escalate. 
1.2.3. Syria’s Response to the Iraq-Iran War 1980-1988 
Following this period, both Iran and Syria held a shared view on Iraq, and 
after the dramatic events of 1979, tensions rose considerably between Iraq and Iran 
and then the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini called on the Iraqi Shiites, who 
make up a staggering 60% of the total population, to rise up against the Baathist 
regime in Baghdad.27 As can be expected, this rattled Saddam Hussein, and he saw 
it as a direct threat to the survival of his rule in Iraq and to his ambitions in the 
region. As this, all occurred during the aftermath of the shocking Egyptian betrayal 
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of the Arab-Israeli struggle when they signed the Camp David accord in 1979. 
Saddam Hussein saw an attack on his neighbor, Iran as an opportunity increase his 
power in the region by expanding oil fields and with relations, as they were, it 
provided a chance to take on a dominant position and assume the role of the 
champion of Arab freedom. Saddam had two aims to fulfill by launching an 
invasion of Iran. Iran wanted to pull out of the Algiers accord signed in 1975 in 
which it had lost much in favor of Iran. Also, Baghdad was afraid of ripples 
spreading from the revolution of Iran. 
In addition, one of Saddam Hussein’s long-held ambitions at that time was 
to gain a dominant position in the Persian Gulf. Iraq had different financial and 
military capacities, and by succeeding over Egypt, Iraq planned to dominate the 
region. Therefore, the domestic turbulence inside Iran was taken by Saddam as an 
indication of Iran’s inherent weakness, and he sought to capitalize on it, as at that 
time the Iranian military was drained by the purges, and also due to executions of 
several high-ranking pro shah military officers. The Ba'athists of Baghdad, 
observing this, grew more confident that in this situation a sweeping victory could 
be obtained by waging war against Iran and would not only topple the new 
revolutionary regime in Tehran but would also lead to Iraq emerging as the 
dominant power in the region.28 
The alliance of Iran and Syria during this period reflected a united view on 
Saddam’s Iraq. In 1980, having pulled out of the Algiers accord and doing so 
virtually spelled a declaration of war on Iran and the government in Syria were 
growingly concerned onlookers as they viewed Iraq as one of the largest and most 
capable military powers in the region. Therefore, there was a very real concern 
regarding the developments and threat of a powerful Iraq in the Middle East. At 
first glance, it may appear inexplicable that two Baathist nations in the same region 
could have such conflicting policies, but when looked into further we see that both 
nations regarded each other more as competing rivals. The ideological rift in the 
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Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party of 1966 saw it form into two warring factions, with one 
in Baghdad and the other in Damascus and a fierce rivalry ensued between the two 
states. Iraq giving asylum to Michel Aflaq, an exiled Syrian political figure, was 
another event that proved to inflame tensions in the relationship. Even with a short 
time of rapprochement between the two states during the 1978 Baghdad 
Conference, animosity dramatically resurfaced once again when Iraq pointed the 
finger at Syria for a coup plot, shortly before the onset of the Iran-Iraq War.29  
With Israel regarded as a more significant concern, Assad in Syria saw that 
Iran’s conflict with Saddam’s Iraq had left them unable to pay attention to Israel. 
Upon the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq, Arab nations focused more on 
what they considered the growing threat from Iran in the region and shifted their 
focus away from the Israel and Palestine issue. For that reason, they were swift in 
support of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. But this meant that Damascus could not count 
on the same level of support for his struggle against Israel. So, this period marked 
a considerable drop in opposition to Israel from the Arab states who were pre-
occupied with Iran as a more direct danger.  
Initially, Syria was actually, hesitating at the start of the conflict, as to which 
position to take, either to place all its might behind Iran or to take the popular option 
and follow the other Arab nations but Assad always condemned the Iraqi invasion 
and called the war, “the wrong war against the wrong enemy at the wrong time”. 
So, Assad strongly denounced the war and simply saw it as creating more enmity 
amongst the Arabs, diverting them from the higher cause of uniting to fight for the 
holy lands in Palestine.30 
       At the same time, Assad could not accept being sandwiched between the 
two hostile states of Israel and Iraq. Israel was viewed by Syria as the main enemy 
and Iraq were more of an ideological rival because they represented a different 
interpretation of Baathist socialism, that had caused deep enmity to and in order for 
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Syria to repel these two major threats, Assad decided to review his approach to the 
Iran-Iraq war and he subsequently placed his support firmly on the Iranian side. 
Assad’s support for Iran took on several forms including, Military, Financial and 
Diplomatic assistances in order to prevent Saddam’s Iraq from coming out on top.  
Firstly and foremost, Shortly before the war the new Iranian regime had 
asked for military support from Assad in Damascus but because he feared the 
political backlash and a negative reaction from the other states in the region and 
from his own people he, therefore, was reluctant but then Assad many long 
meetings with forging envoys from Iran he ended up agreeing on militarily assisting 
Iran and this assistance initially took the form of shipping substantial weaponry to 
Iran, including SAM-7 ground to Air missiles RPG, Sagger, anti-tank rockets, and 
missiles.31      
Moreover, Syria became the conduit for the shipment of Soviet weapons to 
Iran, and in the April of 1981, Syria provided its air space from which Iranian fighter 
jets could carry out air strikes against the Iraqi air force which caused 15-20 percent 
of Iraq’s Air force to be destroyed. Most seriously, was that on a number of 
occasions, Syrian military jets violated Iraqi air space during this time and also, 
with the stepping up of support that Syria strategically gave to rebel groups in Iraq, 
providing military aid and collective training camps, the tables started to turn 
against Saddam. To mount up pressure on Saddam and generate chaos from inside 
Iraq, Syria made sure plenty of weapons got to both the Kurdish insurgents and the 
communist party, who were bitterly opposed to Saddam.32 
      Secondly, when it came to Financial support and Assistance, Hirschfield 
mentions that Syria's assistance for Iran was deliberately intended to damage the 
Iraqi economy and when the Iranian were not able of breaking the stalemate by 
means of their military, they ramped up their strategic economic assault. The Syrian 
regime managed to shut down the Iraqi pipeline that had been operating since 1970 
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with a capacity of 554000 (PDP) barrels per day equivalent to 27,700,000 annually 
transferred oil to the Syrian Terminal of Banias and then to the Lebanese city of 
Tripoli. With the pipeline closed, Iraqi saw a massive annual decrease of 6$ billion 
in its income.33 
       The Iraqi economy and its spending power were hit hard, and in response, 
Saddam started to consider its pipeline with Turkey to regenerate the economic 
situation which was suffering due to the actions of its Baathist rivals in Syria. The 
Baghdad regime expanded output of the Turkish pipeline from 650000 PBD to 
1000000 PBD but it still not reaching the demand. To maintain its military fight 
against Iran, Iraq needed considerable financial support and did manage to obtain 
20,000,000 Euro loans for the construction of pipelines to Jordan and Saudi Arabia. 
However, the cost of all this was that it made bubbles in the economy, which meant 
that the currency fell dramatically from 2 $ billion to 36 $ Billion. 
  The Iraqi government found themselves in a desperate situation as effective 
economic attacks from Syria meant a general deterioration in the economy, and 
therefore, both the Gulf States and the US gave additional loans to Iraq. Gulf 
countries supplied thirty-five billion dollars, and they provided even more by1985. 
Saddam was forced to implement a program of austerity, due to significant losses 
of income and a seriously shrinking foreign currency reserve.  
          Because of these losses from which Iraq’s economy was virtually crippled, 
Iran had hopes that, either the situation would lead to a major revolt against the 
regime in Baghdad or the loyalty of the people would gradually fade away and thus 
confidence in president would be lost, which would end up with the fall of Saddam 
Hussein. Syria and Iran both believed that the damage inflicted economically and 
militarily would topple Saddam’s regime without the need for Iran to take the war 
deep inside Iraqi land.34  
      Last but not least, along with the military and financial support, Syria was also 
generous in providing its new friend Iran with diplomatic support. Arab alliance 
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against the Iranian regime was successfully stopped by Syria, following the onset 
of the war. In 1982, the summit of Amman was hosted by the king of Jordan, who 
was one of the closest allies of Saddam and Syria deployed 30,000 troops on its 
border with the Jordan and also sought to persuade other Arab states to avoid the 
summit.35   
Algeria, Libya, the People's Republic of Yemen and the PLO also boycotted 
the summit, but the summit went ahead, and Syria could certainly not stop the 
summit from taking place. Whereas Syria did manage to have a big effect on Arab 
states which saw them becoming divided into two camps, one side pro-Iran and the 
other anti-Iran which went on to form the GCC or (Gulf Co-operation Council) by 
Saudi Arabia.  
The GCC or (Gulf Co-operation Council), founded in 1981, claims as its 
primary aim, the impeding of internal and external threats. Hirschfield refutes that 
the GCC was formed for the opposing of both internal and external threats. Instead, 
he posits that the core aim was to form a robust anti-Iranian collation. Moreover, 
the GCC had more of an anti-Iranian agenda and also had the support of powerful 
states both the regionally and internationally, including the US. In May 1982, Syria 
for the second time attempted to prevent an anti-Iranian summit and then set up a 
pro-Iranian counter-summit in Damascus attended by Libyan and Iranian foreign 
ministers.36  
1.2.4. Syrian-Iranian Alignment during the Invasion of Lebanon 1982 
When Israel invaded Lebanon, the years that followed represented a 
milestone in the modern history of the region. The events that unfolded in Lebanon 
tested the alliance of Syria and Iran, and the Axis of Resistance appeared to be, for 
the first time, at odds on various fronts with the looming prospect of a break in the 
alliance. 1982 proved to be a year of considerable importance for the future of the 
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alliance and most significantly, Syria and Iran, after close cooperation at the 
outbreak of the Gulf War, found themselves close partners again during the Lebanon 
situation.  
With the general Ariel Sharon being appointed Minister of Defense, Israel 
made a bold move in the Lebanon conflict. The then Israeli Prime Minister, 
Menachem Begin planned an invasion of Lebanon in order to expel the PLO and to 
act as a lesson to Syria. Israel was also hoping to render Lebanon, a state with strong 
ties to Israel and therefore boost Israeli influence in the region.37 The invasion into 
Lebanese territory, carried out by the Israeli army represented considerable military 
upsets, while at the same time it forced an increase in Lebanese-Iranian relations 
and most significantly resulted in the advent of Hezbollah. Syria certainly utilized 
Hezbollah to harm Israel’s military and political agenda in Lebanon. Iran was also 
successful in using Hezbollah as a propaganda tool for spreading its brand of 
political Shiite revolutionary ideology throughout the region. 
The Syria-Iran alliance, during this time, was quite seriously stretched and 
the Iranians contributions to the forming of Hezbollah, whilst neglecting the Syrian-
backed Amal was one of the main reasons. Syria was not jumping for joy about 
Hezbollah and held an even suspicious stance towards them, but Iran was the 
sponsors of Hezbollah, playing a key part in their creation because Hezbollah as a 
Shiite ally of Iran, was an important military proxy for Iran in Lebanon. Syria had 
a position of authority in Lebanon regarding decisions about its political trajectory, 
so this was another reason for complications and difficulties regarding what Syria 
and Iran could agree on in Lebanon. 
So, it is certainly a major point to note, that the armies of Iran and Syria 
managed to collaborate effectively with each other in Lebanon, following the Israeli 
invasion of 1982. Israel’s invasion of southern Lebanon was felt in Damascus as a 
direct security threat and the US viewed Hafiz al-Assad as following the Soviet 
Union. Assad came up with a very effective strategy in response to this situation 
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which was referred to as the Shield and Sword Strategy, with the shield meaning 
the defensive aspect for which he used the Soviets and the Sword meaning the 
offensive element, for which he utilized Iranian influence on the Shiite community 
of Lebanon.38 
When it was clear that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) would stay in 
Lebanon, then Syria and Iran encouraged their Shiite militant groups to go in and 
attack. In 1982, one of the impressive things that happened was the relentless 
Guerilla warfare of the Shiite Lebanese militants abasing the Israelis and the Shiite 
population having no qualms about resorting suicide attacks. On November 11, in 
the city of Tyre, a suicide attack resulted in 67 dead Israeli soldiers. Iran joined in 
deploying ITS revolutionary Guards Quds Forces (IRGC-QF) to the Bekaa valley 
via Syria in order to oppose Israel and its imperialist agenda in the region.39 
1.2.5. Syria-Iran Relations after the US Invasion of Iraq 2003 
The extraordinary spectacle of September 11 meant a world where the war 
terror was the main agenda, was to become divided into, according to the Bush 
administration, those who are with us or against us. In other words, those who 
would support the US’s War on Terror and those who would not. Therefore, in the 
atmosphere of the aftermath of the famous attack on the Twin Towers in New York 
and the subsequent US lead invasion of Afghanistan, interestingly, both Syria and 
Iran supported the United States’ counter-terrorism activities. The Islamic Republic 
financially and militarily aided the fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan. In 2002 
Syria was hailed as a major CIA intelligence provider, giving a lot of priceless 
information to assist the intelligence operations on al-Qaida, which was to an end 
only with the invasion of Iraq in 2003.40  
Due to the US invasion of Iraq the following year, the diplomatic scenery 
shifted once more and both Syria and Iran became weary of how swiftly the 
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Americans had demolished the regime in Baghdad, while they were pleased to see 
the demise of a long-term foe, at the same time they knew very well how they could 
be next on the US hit list of the Americans, as Wallsh (2013) puts it in his own 
words: 42 
“For example, Richard Perle suggested as early as 2001 that the Syrians 
might be next on America’s hit list after Afghanistan and Iraq. And in April 
2003, one month after the U.S. military invaded Iraq, Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Paul Wolfowitz warned: “[t]here will have to be changed in Syria, 
plainly.” In fact, even before September 11 nearly three dozen influential 
Washington figures, many of whom would play a role in the Bush era’s 
foreign policy, signed a report calling for military intervention in Syria” 
Wallsh (2013) 41 
Thereon, Assad began to refuse information to the CIA and assumed an adversarial 
stance towards Washington in general. The regime in Damascus started to assist the 
path of Sunni fighters heading for Iraq in order to oppose the American army and 
meanwhile Iran also started cultivating relations with the Shiites political parties in 
Iraq in a bid to push political factions into prominence who were friendly to Tehran 
and who stood a chance at becoming the new government. Yet the prospect of an 
out and out civil war in Iraq was something that nobody wanted, including Syria 
and Iran, so they had to tread carefully not to increase the already worsening 
situation. Therefore, both Syria and Iran agreed that as the US military presence 
continued to strengthen, they would take action against it.42 
Western assaults on both Syria and Iran on the Lebanese front occurred more 
and more and in 2005, with the killing of the former Lebanese president, Hariri, 
Saudi Arabia, and the USA took this as an opportunity deal a heavy blow to Syria 
and Hezbollah, Iran’s two main allies. The terrorist attack was the perfect 
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justification for the West to force Syria out of Lebanon. But this move became a 
major game changer because it moved Assad ever closer to Hezbollah and Tehran, 
having been utterly infuriated by the forced withdrawal of 18000 troops. On 12 July 
2006, Hezbollah triggered a war with Israel after kidnapping two Israeli soldiers 
and killing eight in a cross-border raid. All evidence pointed to the Syria-Iran axis 
of resistance being in full support of Hezbollah, regardless of both nation’s official 
denial of US claims of their involvement in the conflict. The war went on to last 
only six weeks but was a considerable military breakthrough in the history of the 
Arab - Israeli conflict.43 
Hezbollah claimed victory and this claim was even echoed by some pundits 
at the time. Hezbollah’s leader Nasrallah became one of the most popular figures 
Arab world, due to his successfully inflicting a defeat on the Israeli army. Both 
Syrian and Iranian standing in the region had been boosted and maybe even more 
significantly was the triple alliance that had been formed, giving Iran strategic depth 
in the core of the Arab world, with limited retaliatory capability against Israel.  
1.3. Concluding Remarks  
Over the last forty years, the relationship between Syria and Iran has 
managed to survive through all the changes and challenges in the Middle East 
during that time. Since the Islamic revolution of Iran in 1979, the region has seen 
significant changes but Damascus and Tehran have continued to work together in 
one way or another, maintaining and preserving their mutual alliance and have 
clearly emerged as the most enduring partnership of any nation in the Middle 
Eastern region, where alliances are hard to come by and often temporary.                           
The partnership between Syria and Iran can be said to have essentially a 
defensive purpose. It has primarily been motivated by a mutual requirement to 
guard against outside forces. The coalition that was established during the Iran-Iraq 
war and the 1982 Israeli-American coalition in Lebanon when Israel invaded 
Lebanon were examples of these strong external powers acting in the region. The 
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religious solidarity of Shi‘a Iran and the Shi’a Alawite sect of the Assad family is 
noted by scholars, but religious links are not the most influential factor in their 
alliance. Especially during the Iran - Iraq war, Syria‘s Pan- Arabist philosophy was 
avoiding the war being defined as a Shi‘a bid to take over the Sunni majority.  
After the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, it became clearer how much the 
alliance was of a defensive nature. At first Syria and Iran had taken a bandwagoning 
approach, offering assistance to the United States to fight terrorism. Following the 
events of 2003, Tehran and Damascus further strengthened their cooperation in 
order to combat the rising US influence in the region.  
Finally, the historical overview proves how much the two countries 
initiatives and interests have been intertwined over the last 40 years, cementing an 
alliance which has been vital for the regional survival of both countries. Most 
importantly, Tehran sees Syria as the bedrock of the Corridor of Resistance, 
stretching from Iraq to Lebanon and Syria that it has built against the United States 
and Israel. 
However, the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 constitutes a major 
challenge for the future of the alliance, threatening the survival of Iran’s most 
important ally in the region. The outcome may have a more substantial impact on 
Iran than any other country in the Middle East. Therefore, the next two chapters 
will thus analyze the Iranian policy towards the Syrian War and the degree of 
Tehran‘s involvement in the conflict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31 
 
Chapter II 
IRANIAN REACTION VIS-À-VIS THE UPRISINGS WITH A SPECIAL 
EMPHASIS ON SYRIA 
 
When the Arab Spring, sprung out in Tunisia in the winter of 2010-2011 
and subsequently rapidly spread across other states in the Arab world, Iran declared 
its sympathy and support for the protests against pro-Western regimes, painting the 
events as Islamic awakenings. Iran ambitiously claimed that there was a new era of 
pan-Islamic movements in the Middle East and North Africa, where oppressive 
anti-Islamic regimes would transform into Islamic governments. As Tehran saw it, 
the tide had finally turned against the West, and history seemed to be turning in 
favor of Iran and its supporters. However, this was to take another twist with the 
eruption of similar uprisings in Syria, which Iran had not anticipated, and which put 
Iran in a rather awkward position by throwing its support behind the Syrian regime. 
Hence, the problem of the peaceful Syrian protests then became the problem of a 
Civil War characterized by regional proxies with Iran taking an active role. The 
regional proxy war then became a proxy war of powerful global actors. In this 
respect, the purpose of this chapter in the first stage is to thoroughly analyze the 
Iranian Reaction vis-à-vis the Uprisings with a Special Emphasis on Syria, while in 
the second stage the chapter aims to set out an explanation of the Syrian crisis by 
taking into account all the Internal, Regional and International Dimensions. 
 
2. GENERAL BACKGROUND   
 The Arab uprisings were assumed to be waves of demonstrations and 
protests which initially started in Tunisia on December 18, 2010, following the self-
immolation of a hands-on salesman called Mohamed Bouazizi in protest to his ill-
treatment by municipal officials which led to the escape and overthrow of the Ben 
Ali regime in Tunisia. The subsequent developments in Tunisia completely 
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changed the political landscape of North Africa and the Middle East by 
overthrowing pro-Western regimes.44  
 The developments termed as the "Arab Spring," shaped the regional 
politics in early 2010 from North Africa and expanded to the Levant and the Gulf 
in a matter of weeks. Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and then Bahrain and Yemen 
were all hit by these upheavals. Although it has been claimed by the Iranian regime 
that these developments in the region are the continuation of Islamic awakening, 
this term, however, was rejected by many political analysts. It is believed that all 
these upheavals in the region, starting in 2010 in Tunisia grew out of many common 
grievances such as political repression, lack of freedom, corruption, unemployment, 
and no democratic rights. These developments, which were a unique phenomenon 
in this geopolitical region, affected the foreign policy of all regional actors, 
including the Islamic Republic of Iran.45  
 In a Friday prayer sermon in Tehran the Supreme Leader, Grand 
Ayatollah Khamenei, asserted that the primary factor behind these uprisings was 
the feeling of humiliation that has been imposed forcefully by their puppet leaders 
who had been dependent on US and Israel. According to the supreme leader, the 
world was neglecting the fact that these developments are the continuation of the 
Islamic Revolution of 1979.46   
 Furthermore, the beginning of the Arab Spring in the Middle East and 
North Africa has paved the way for a change in power equations. Ben Ali's retreat 
from Tunisia and the fall of Mubarak in Egypt were enough to shake the Saudi axis 
in the region and seriously threaten Israel's security. On the other hand, Turkey and 
Iran, as the two leading regional powers, were prepared to redefine their position in 
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light of these changes and they welcomed the fall of the Ben Ali regime, and in the 
meantime, they demanded Mubarak to resign from his post.47 
 The initial response of the Islamic Republic of Iran to these changes in the 
region was positive. Iran had its calculations; it believed that an Islamic type of 
government would take the place of the pro-Western regimes. It also felt that these 
Islamic governments would not only boost the Iranian position in the region, but 
they would also adopt a hostile and antagonistic policy toward Israel and the US. 
Moreover, Tehran thought that even if an Islamist government did not come to 
power, it would still see Iran in a unique position because any weakening of US 
allies in the region such as Egypt would magnify Iran’s regional influence.48  
     In a profound sense, Iran had two different stances, in North Africa and 
the Gulf, Tehran, with the use of "Islamic Awakening," expressing its joy at the 
developments. While in Levant Iran had contradictory positions which both are 
going to be elaborated in the following way.  
2.1. Iranian Stance towards the Uprisings in North Africa  
Tehran, in North Africa, celebrated the collapse of the pro-Western regimes 
of Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak. Tehran deemed the Protests in Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Libya as an “Islamic Awakening.” At those initial phases, it responded to the 
protests in Egypt and Tunisia with encouragement. The fall of those regimes were 
significant for Iran because, on the one hand, it bolstered the Iranian position in the 
region and on the other hand, it weakened the once strategic allies of the West and 
Israel, thus paving the way for Iran to project its power and to maneuver freely in 
the region. Iran, by then, believed that it had exported the revolutionary ideologies 
to North Africa which gave Iranian officials great optimism in early 2011. 
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Also, the retreat of Ben Ali from Tunisia and the fall of Mubarak in Egypt 
shook the Saudi axis in the region and threatened Israel's security. Iran, as one of 
the leading regional powers, was prepared to shift its position in relation to these 
events. Iran’s welcoming of the fall of the Ben Ali regime and the resignation of 
Mubarak were echoed by Turkey at the beginning of the upheavals, with the only 
difference being that the Turk’s support was welcomed, and Iranian support was 
met with a significant degree of cynicism due to long-held Arab sensitivities toward 
Iran. In the meantime, Iranian leaders, with the use of the term "Islamic 
Awakening," expressed their joy in these developments. The fall of Mubarak in 
Egypt for Iran meant the withdrawal of Saudi Arabia's strategic alliance from the 
equation and the shattering of Israel's security.49 In strategic terms, the subsequent 
ousting of Muhammad Morsi and the political sidelining of the Muslim 
Brotherhood was another severe blow to Iran’s Islamic‐awakening narrative of 
post–Arab Spring developments. 
In the case of Libya, historically, relations between Iran and Libya had 
maintained ever since 1979, and it is said that Libya was among the first Arab 
nations to throw its support behind Iran in its war against Iraq in 1980-88 and both 
countries had common policies toward Israel. Moreover, through this period, 
contrary to its Arab brethren, Libya was not critical of Iranian foreign policy in the 
region. However, their relations sunk to some degree after the disappearance of the 
Iranian Shiite leader Musa al Sadr. In an official visit to Libya in 1978, Musa al 
Sadr disappeared, which arose serious tensions between the two countries. Ever 
since Iran and Libya maintained on and off diplomatic relations.50   
     With the start of the demonstrations and ensuing military conflict in Libya, 
Western countries, including the GCC members and Turkey, put their support 
behind the protesters. But in Tehran, there was still no serious reaction, it welcomed 
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the legitimate demands of the Libyan people, but at the same time, it did not support 
NATO's intervention in Libya.51  
Iran had accepted the fact that the Gaddafi regime was crumbling quickly, 
and it would allow Iran to maintain close and friendly relations with a new regime 
that would have a favorable stance toward Iran. Therefore, Iran ended up placing 
support behind protestors while at the same, it remained cautious of the Western 
countries’ motives in Libya. Iran believed that the West mainly the US may use the 
protection of civilians as a pretext for its intervention in Libya which would not 
only manipulate the process of regime change in Libya but would also install a 
puppet regime that would be dependent on the West.52 
Therefore, the NATO military invasion of Libya on March 19, 2011, to 
topple Moammar Qaddafi was a setback for Iran, but it produced close relations 
with the prospective regime in Tripoli and the West. Therefore, according to Iranian 
thought, the West had “hijacked” the revolutionary movement of the Libyan 
people.53  
Political analysts also underline the fact that the Iranian policy in Tunisia, 
Egypt, and Libya was based on preserving its interest. For Iran, Egypt, as one of 
the pioneers of the Arab nations, has an extraordinary place in its foreign policy. 
After the fall of Hosni Mubarak, Iran tried to maintain a closer relationship with the 
new government, However, things changed when President Morsi came to power, 
he was a critique of Iranian intervention in Syria as seen in his speeches in which 
he was clearly condemning Iranian involvement in Syria.54 NATO intervention plus 
Morsi’s speech provoked a mass reaction from the Iranian side, thus leading Iran to 
lose its hopes in North Africa. 
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Overall, the Iranian regime welcomed the establishment of the new 
government in North Africa. However; its relations remained limited contrary to its 
expectations. Iran had hoped that with the establishment of the new regimes in 
North Africa, they would gain the upper hand, but this was not to be so. 
2.2. Iranian Stance towards the Uprisings in the Gulf and Levant  
The Islamic Republic of Iran, in general, assessed the developments in the 
Gulf particularly in Yemen and Bahrain along with others in the North Africa, 
Libya, Tunisia and Egypt in the form of Islamic awakening, which deposed Western 
influence in the region. Iran in the Gulf supported the ouster of the pro-Saudi and 
Western regimes and accused both the leaders of Yemen; Ali Abdullah Saleh and 
the Bahraini King Sheikh Hamad of not responding to the reasonable demands of 
their citizens.  
With respect to Yemen, Iran's priorities were focused on preserving its 
interests. Yemen bears significance for Iran because of its location in the backyard 
of its opponent, Saudi Arabia. Yemen has remained a battleground for both the 
Wahhabi regime of Saudi Arabia and the Iranian regime of the Shiite Mullahs.55 
Saudi Arabia and Iran have also had serious disputes over the Yemeni 
government and the Houthi minority who live in the northern province of Saada. 
Government leaders from Saudi Arabia and Yemen had repeatedly accused Iran of 
supporting the Houthis with financial and military assistance via the Quds Forces 
of the IRGC. The Houthis who follow five imams differ from mainstream Shiites 
who follow twelve imams; nevertheless, the Houthis in Yemen are considered a 
legitimate branch of the Shiite by the Ayatollahs of Iran. Therefore, Saudi and 
Yemeni government officials have repeatedly accused Tehran of seeking to divert 
the Houthis from their mainstream principle toward a more militant Shiite Twelver 
religion.56 Shahram Chubin (2012), in his article, argues that one of Iran's primary 
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concern in Yemen was to curb and pressure Saudi influence. While at the same 
time, Tehran believed supporting the Yemeni opposition would help Iran to 
influence the strategic straight of the Bab Al Mandeb.57    
 Meanwhile, in the case of Bahrain, Iran viewed the Bahraini protests as 
“the right revolution in the right place.” Bahrain’s developments broke out with the 
gathering of several senators against the Egyptian embassy in Manama and 
announced their support for the Egyptian revolution and then planned for an anti-
government protest in February.  
Likewise, the regional actors and trans-national powers’ attitude toward 
Bahrain's developments differed in terms of the specific goals and interests of each 
of them in the Persian Gulf region. The Islamic Republic of Iran's policy toward 
Bahrain is different from other developments in the Arab world.  Based on a 
combination of interests and values because on the one hand, Bahrain is at the 
political-security field of Iran and on the other hand, it is at the strategic and 
sensitive area of the Persian Gulf. Bahrain is the regional ally of the conservative 
Arab countries and a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The United States 
also has military bases in Bahrain, while it has historically been claimed by Iran as 
part of its territory. And more interestingly, most of the Bahraini population is 
Shiite, making Iran naturally sympathetic toward the Shiite community in 
Bahrain.58  
     As the crisis intensified, Bahraini authorities declared a state of martial law 
and knocked on the doors of other Gulf countries for help and military assistance. 
On March 14, 2011, Saudi Arabia and UAE, in total, deployed around 1500 troops 
in Bahrain to help the Bahraini King Hamad in his attempt to quell the peaceful 
protesters. In order to justify their interventions in Bahrain, Bahraini officials 
claimed that the Gulf Cooperation Council has been working to help Bahrain in 
preventing Iranian influence in its domestic policies.59  
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Iran responded to Saudi military intervention in Bahrain backed by the GCC 
states with anger, Iran designated the Saudi intervention in Bahrain as an occupation 
of a country, and it further called on the UN to stop the killing of Bahraini people. 
In addition, the Iranian supreme leader accused the Al Khalifa family of suppressing 
the voices of the innocent Shiite population. He additionally stated that it is the legal 
right of the people to protests against their government. In the meantime, he also 
warned the Bahraini regime of having embraced a wrong policy toward its people, 
and Iran for the sake of protecting these people will not sit silent and such repression 
will be faced with a harsh response.60 
However, in Bahrain, Iran is accused of taking advantage of the Shiite 
denomination of the Bahraini people, Iran primary purpose of in Bahrain was to 
narrow down the American presence as it is home to a US military base. To do so, 
Iran in Bahrain used the mantra of protecting the Shiite population from the dictator 
by putting its support behind the protestors.61 However, currents reversed 
unexpectedly against Iranian dreams in Bahrain when the Saudi led collation forces 
intervened. Therefore, the Saudi intervention was considered a significant blow to 
the Iranian position, limiting Iranian efforts in Bahrain. Thus, the course of 
developments shattered the initial optimism of Iran towards the Arab Spring and 
turned it into a formidable challenge for Iran. 
Furthermore, the first challenge raised by the Arab Spring for Iran was the 
spread of a Revolutionary wave into Syria on March 16, 2011. The ruling Baath 
regime in Syria is the long-time and only ally of Iran among the Arab states.  Iran 
did not lose time in depicting the growing opposition against the Assad 
administration as a plot of the enemies of the Islamic Awakening. The Iranian 
leadership regards resistance to Israel and the American hegemony as the most 
important characteristic of Islamic awakening. Therefore, any rebellion against the 
regime part of the resistance front were deemed illegitimate such as in the case of 
the Assad administration, which Tehran sees it as a part of the “Resistance Front” 
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against the “Israeli occupation” and the American hegemony, thus it was 
unacceptable to the Iranian leadership to see a regime change in Syria supported by 
the West and Israel.  
Overall, in the Levant especially in the Syrian crisis, Iran's policy is 
primarily based on maintaining strategic interests and its place in the region's 
political-security equilibrium, especially in the area of relations with Hezbollah and 
Hamas, as well as the Arab-Israeli peace process, in which Iran plays a critical role. 
Syria plays a vital role in Iran's strategic ties in the Mediterranean and the Near 
East. 
2.3. Evolution of the Syrian Crisis 
 When looking at the Syrian uprisings, it can be observed that in the 
beginning, people protested because of the hardships they had been suffering for 
decades. Despite Bashar al Assad pushing for change, no concrete reforms were 
introduced. Therefore, scholars have proposed various theories to explain the origin 
of the unrest in Syria. Most scholars make a distinction between some of the factors 
at work which sparked the crisis in Syria and those of Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, 
Bahrain, and Yemen. While all these countries shared common problems, with the 
Syrian crisis, scholars also point to other determinants that all together triggered 
unrest in Syria, such as a dramatic shift in socio-economic factors and draught.   
  In case of the Syrian protests, Kristen L. Davis (2015); proposes that 
considering the Syrian crisis many suggest various factors as mentioned above such 
as corruption, limited political participation, limited freedom, and poverty, etc. 
However, along with all these factors, he also blames draught or water scarcity for 
the evolution of the Syrian crisis. Kristen L. Davis (2015), believes that water 
scarcity forced people, mostly the Sunni population to migrate to other cities 
changing the demographics of the cities and causing poverty as a result.62  
Meanwhile, there are other scholars such as Bonfatti (2017), who blame 
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unjust economic policies for the ignition of the Syrian crisis. It is said that Bashar 
al Assad followed in his father’s footsteps by further hastening neoliberal policies 
that only privileged the inner circle of Assad.63  
 Overall, Christopher Philips (2018), in his book under the title of “The battle 
for Syria: International Rivalry in the new Middle East,” sums up the Syrian crisis 
by implying that when Bashar al Assad came to power, he attempted to increase his 
popularity. Assad, contrary to his father who was living in the Syrian presidential 
palace, high on the top of Damascus, opted to live among the community in a 
modest apartment and was only using his father’s castle for official visits and 
functions. Moreover, in contrast to his father, Assad was easily approachable with 
less security, driving his car in the urban areas, giving the Syrian president Bashar 
Al Assad modest fame among Syrians.64 
         After his father died, Assad vowed in his inauguration speech to be more 
democratic and open and promised to pave the way for more political participation 
for his citizens. He also stated in an interview with CNN that he would be different 
from his father, “I shall try my very best to lead our country toward a future that 
fulfills the hopes and legitimate ambitions of our people.”65 
In the meantime, he also vowed to make reforms in the field of economy. 
Following his takeover, he launched a five-year plan in 2006, private banks were 
allowed to operate, an increase in the FDI or Foreign Direct Investment prompted 
growth in the GDP at the rate of 12%, and it doubled from 27.9 billion to 60.1 
billion USD between the years of 2005 and 2010.  
        However, problems still existed despite his hard push to change the 
regime’s image among people. Christopher Philips (2018) calls, Assad push for 
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change as a “murky reality” in which Assad unsuccessfully attempted to change the 
regime’s image. Assad, contrary to his father, promoted family members into the 
key positions such as his brother Maher, and his brother in law Asif Shawkat and 
his cousin Asif Makhlouf.  Despite his promise in his inauguration, no political 
opening was pursued, political parties were restricted as usual except from one 
loyalist party, the Syrian nationalist party, which was also dominated by the Baath 
party. Members of dissident parties most notably members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and many liberal leaders were punished and put in jail.  
 Moreover, the state of emergency law was still in place since 1963, and the 
regime feared from every single citizen. Therefore, it had dispatched Mukhabarat 
or the secret police trained by the Eastern German police. The Mukhabarat using 
the tactics of the East German police were vital in keeping watch over people and 
dissidents. These agents of Mukhabarat were famous for the persecution and torture 
of the civilians. When the Syrian crisis first broke out, people had really had enough 
of the Mukhabarat (agents). Therefore, the actions of the Mukhabarat was the 
primary target of their anger. 
 Furthermore, the author also blames the sudden shift of the socialist 
economy to a more capitalist economy in which the government had a nepotistic 
agenda. People having close links to Assad or people of the inner circle of Assad 
benefited from the economic reforms, while the poor were deprived of their rights. 
Corruption and nepotism were at a peak, specific families, including Assad’s 
cousins, had a significant stake in the economy while others were simply banned 
from entering into the market. 
 Contrary to Hafiz al Assad who had Sunnis placed in key roles equally with 
Alawites, Bashar instead sidelined the Sunni members of the Baath party, and he 
only allowed the Alawite members of his community to take critical places in the 
regime civil and security apparatuses. Alawite - Sunni tension remained high and 
unfair discrimination was noted in many areas such as in the city of Homs, Alawites 
enjoyed more privileges and were provided jobs by the government in contrast to 
their Sunni countrymen. Therefore, it is believed that the sectarian division between 
 42 
 
Alawites and Sunnis also played a crucial role in fueling the Syrian uprising in 2011 
against the regime of Bashar al Assad.66 
         Overall, various factors such as socioeconomic, Political, sectarian tension, 
poverty, and unjust wrong economic policies are all believed to have motivated the 
Syrian people to revolt against the regime in 2011. However, it is equally important 
to find out what factors shifted the peaceful Syrian revolution into a civil war? In 
order to answer this question, it is important to study the Syrian uprising in three 
different dimensions (Internal, Regional, and International) as in the following way. 
2.3.1. Internal Dimensions  
In the early days of 2011, people across Syria took to the streets to demand 
for the release of the prisoners and more civil rights. Syrians from across the country 
gathered in front of Egyptian and Tunisian embassies to show their solidarity with 
the Egyptian and Tunisian demonstrators. Initially, numerous calls for 
demonstrations were made in Syria without much response.  However, the matter 
of the Syrian crisis escalated when in early 2011 people took to the streets in various 
cities, including provincial towns such as Homs, Deraa, Idlib, Telkalakh, and Tafas. 
It was the protest in southern Derra that would ignite the revolution among Syrians. 
A traditionally Sunni province which in the past it had its support behind the regime, 
but several factors such as the Economic hardships, Drought, and Negligence of the 
government triggered waves of rebellion in the city.67 
In March 2011, a group of teenagers and schoolboys were arrested for 
painting anti-Bashar graffiti slogans, “Down with Bashar Al Assad” on their school 
walls in Derra. They were captured and subjected to torture by the regime; their 
fingernails being ripped out. When their parents demanded their immediate release, 
a cousin of Bashar, Atef Najib, told the families to forget their children and make 
new ones or let him have their wives so that he could make new ones for them. 
Therefore, families whose pleas were ridiculed and ignored, arranged a massive 
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protest outside the Derra central Omari mosque. Security forces used live 
ammunition and tears gas, killing four protestors. The next day at the funeral of 
those killed in the protest, more people joined the demonstrations chanting the anti-
regime slogan, and they set fire to the office of Syriatel and the Baath Party in 
Derra.68 
Large segments of the Syrian people, including middle-income, wealthy and 
poor people, joined the protestors. In July 500,000 people gathered in Hama’s al 
Assay square to protest against the regime.  In response, the regime responded very 
harshly to demonstrations in cities such as Homs, Deraa, Banias, Telkalakh, Tafas, 
Rastan and elsewhere in the country. Troops supported by massive military tanks 
were deployed in some major cities to prevent people from reaching to the major 
squares. While in other cities such as Homs and Idlib, the regime conducted a 
massive military operation against the protestors by using helicopter gunships and 
armored tanks killing dozens and forcing thousands to flee to neighboring Turkey.69 
As the deadly protests continued, the government took harsh measures in 
Derra by cutting electricity and water and mobile phone networks. However, none 
of these preventative measures could stop the protestors. Initially, the protests were 
not all about the overthrow of the regime. Instead, most of the Syrian protestors 
demanded reforms. Therefore, some political commentators underline the fact that 
Bashar Assad could have contained the initial phase of the crisis by taking the 
example of Jordan’s approach towards the protestors, in Jordan, the monarchy had 
ordered the police well treat the protestors and avoid clashing with them.70 
However, in Syria, Bashar and his Generals refused to show any sympathy 
towards the protestors; instead, they used force to disperse the demonstrators, which 
as a result triggered bitter feelings of revenge for protestors such as in the case of 
Derra where regime forces exaggerated in torturing the peaceful protestors. When 
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people in other parts of Syria learned about the events and the regime’s brutality in 
Derra, they took to the streets against the regime. Therefore, it is claimed that 
government violence and its killing of its own people were accountable for 
triggering the cycle of the violence that soon turned into an ongoing Civil War.71 
In the meantime, the situation further escalated when Assad in a speech in 
2011 called the protestors “germs” who are being led by criminal gangs and jihadist 
rebels supported by outside powers. Assad, in the meantime, continued his call for 
national dialogue while he also continued cracking on the protestors. Therefore, it 
resulted in people joining the demonstrators to seek personal revenge for their 
family members killed by the regime.72  
Moreover, as the tide of the situation waned against Assad, the regime opted 
for a sectarian policy to win over the support of the minorities. Syria is a 
heterogeneous country; home to various religious groupings such as Christians, 
Alawites, Kurds, Ismailis, Druze, and many more. The government was able to 
cleverly exploit this by playing its sectarian card to gain support from the minority 
groups. When looking at the case of minorities, one can understand the fact that 
minorities in Syria enjoyed full freedom, and therefore, they saw the fall of Assad 
as costly and dangerous for them. Thus, the minority groups, mainly of the Alawite 
and Christians threw their full support behind the regime by deploying some of its 
groups with the Syrian army in their fighting against the rebels or Sunni protestors 
in particularly.73 
Furthermore, among one of the most important internal dimensions of the 
Syrian Civil war was the defection of the Syrian military officers. As the war in 
Syria escalated some of the high, and low-level officers defected to the protestors’ 
side by forming a paramilitary force what would later emerge as Free Syrian Army 
(FSA), under the leadership of Col. Riad al-Asaad in Antakya, Turkey.74 
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Although debated, it is said that in order to show the world a different image 
of the Syrian crisis, Bahar al Assad kept his eyes blind on the activities of the Syrian 
hardlines groups in Syria. Therefore, it is believed that in an attempt to manipulate 
the real face of the Syrian protests, Bashar al Assad would release hundreds of 
hardline Islamists. Thus, after the unrest, various jihadi groups emerged most 
notably the Syrian Jabhatu Al Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham, advocating a vicious 
sectarian agenda against the Alawites.75 
 Overall, the Syrian were protests inspired by the Arab spring started in 
Damascus and other cities that turned violent after the deadly events of the 
teenagers that were killed and tortured by the Assad regime. People, in the 
beginning, wanted a change and reforms in the political system, in the initial phases 
of the demonstrations protestors never sought regime change. However, there were 
a number of internal factors that later paved the way for the evolution of the Syrian 
War.  
2.3.2. Regional Dimensions  
 Regional dimensions, likewise, the internal dimensions are also considered 
to have a vital role in the evolution of the Syrian civil war. At first glance, all 
regional actors faced a lack of bandwidth; they did not know whether to put their 
support behind Assad or the rebels. Therefore, initially, some of the regional actors 
advised the Syrian president to listen to his people. However, none of these advices 
were taken seriously. Therefore, the situation immediately changed the situation 
changed in the policies of both regional and transregional players. Most of these 
countries made a U-turn in their policies towards the Syrian regime, making Syria 
as a major hub of competition and a proxy war bred ground for regional and 
international players.  
         Although on the ground, Syrians fought in the battles, regional actors had 
significant stakes in shaping the Syrian Civil War. Confrontation among various 
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regional actors generated two opposing fronts, the first consisting of Iran, Iraq on 
the state level and the Lebanese Hezbollah on the non-state level, while on the other 
hand in the second front there was Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey, all offering 
their support to the rebels. Beside major regional actors, there are other players such 
as Israel, the Kurds, and Jordan, who also have stakes in the Syrian civil war, yet 
their roles are assumed to be limited to narrow interests.  
        Moreover, one can firmly claim that Israel should be included in the 
regional dimension. However, Israeli involvement during the initial stages of the 
crisis remained aloof. If not indifferent, Israeli reaction became conspicuous in the 
later stages of the Syrian crisis and sought to check Iran and Hezbollah’s 
encroachments in the Golan Heights, an area under Israeli occupation since the 
1967 war.  
        The Regional dimension consists of three regional groups of countries that 
have played a vital role over the course of the crisis: The Gulf in the south, Iran in 
the East and Turkey in the North. Regionally with no doubt, the competition among 
the countries mentioned earlier led the Syrian crisis to an ongoing civil war.  
In regard to the role of the Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, 
each had significant stakes in the evolution of the Syrian civil war. First and 
foremost, when the Syrian uprising broke out, the house of Saud was preoccupied 
with its own problems. The uprisings in North Africa also encouraged some of the 
Saudi citizens to protest against the monarchy. Initially, the Saudi authorities 
responded to the protests with violence and detentions of the protestors. In some 
parts of the country, the presence of the security forces was increased for the sake 
of precautions. However, to calm down the protestors, the Saudi monarchy, in the 
later stages, took some cautious steps by announcing $130 Billion investments in 
various sectors and this seemed to some degree effective in silencing the protestors. 
The monarchy’s plan was largely successful as it tackled unemployment, and it also 
increased the income of the people. However, problems still existed in the Eastern 
Shiite region with most of the Saudi Shiites feeling betrayed due to the monarchy’s 
discriminatory stance against them. The Saudi Shiites repeatedly took to the streets, 
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causing a headache for the Monarchy. The monarchy regarded these protests as a 
threat to their rule, therefore, to stop the spread of the Arab spring before it arrived 
on the Saudi shore, the monarchy acted very carefully in the case of Syria.76 
The Saudi monarchy initially kept its silence over Assad’s actions against 
his people. Riyadh believed it was best to stick at encouraging Assad to introduce 
some cosmetic reforms. The monarchy also announced millions of dollars in loans 
to the Syrian regime on the condition that Assad ceases his crackdown on the 
protestors. Even on the personal level, King Abdullah sent his son Prince Abdul 
Aziz bin Abdullah three times to Damascus to encourage Assad to introduce 
reforms in the whole system.77 However, Saudi’s stance gradually changed over 
time when Bashar al Assad ignored offers both at a state and personal level. It was 
in August 2011, when the Saudi king called Assad’s crackdowns on the protestors 
a breach of Islamic values, and he urged Assad to “stop the killing machine.” He 
also said as “Large numbers of martyrs have fallen, their blood has been shed, and 
many others have been wounded,” and this must stop immediately or face harsher 
measures from the Arab league.78 
As Saudi lost hope in advising the Syrian president, Iran seemed to be the 
beneficiary of the Syrian crisis. After the initial stages of the uprising, Iran had sent 
its Revolutionary Guards or the IRGC-Quds forces to Syria on an advisory mission 
to help Assad in quelling the peaceful protestors. The Iranian presence meant a 
significant blow to the Saudis regional interests. Therefore, the monarchy genuinely 
became concerned about Iranian involvement in Syria. The Saudis believed that 
Iran might expand its influence in the region by taking advantage of instability in 
the Arab states. Therefore, it entered into a proxy war with Iran and with no doubt, 
the Syrian uprising turned into a proxy war for supremacy between regional player, 
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notably the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran. For Riyadh, it was essential to push 
back Iranian influence in the region.79  
Thus, at the end of 2011, Saudi Arabia had expressed its support for the 
rebels, its support not only meant to fight Assad, but it also entailed a concerted 
effort to curb Iranian influence in the region. Therefore, to combat Iran’s agenda, 
Saudi Arabia approached the Syrian issue both at a financial and diplomatic level. 
Although there are no Saudi troops deployed to Syria, Saudi Arabia has steadily 
provided both diplomatic and financial support for rebels in their fight against the 
regime of Bashar al Assad. 
Overall, Saudi views the Syrian conflict through the Iranian lens; The 
Saudi’s fear of Iranian influence in the region meant they strongly opposed Assad 
taking the side of Iran and Saudi Arabia has accused Iran of taking advantage of the 
instability in Syria by expanding its power in the Levant, particularly in Syria and 
Lebanon. Therefore, to resist these challenges in the region, the house of Saud 
adopted a confrontational tone in their policy towards the Syrian regime.80    
 Meanwhile, like the Saudi Kingdom, Qatar did not at first rush to abandon 
Assad because of some specific reasons, firstly, during the years before the uprising 
in 2011, Doha had maintained good diplomatic relations with Syria. Secondly, Doha 
had invested millions of Dollars in the Syrian economy. Therefore, there was no 
prompt response from the Qatari side to the uprising in 2011. Like, the Saudi king, 
the Qatari Emir Hamad sent his son Prince Tamim to Syria to advise Assad to end 
the violence. Similar approaches were also made by the Emir’s daughter, to the 
Syrian president’s wife Asma, but all they ended fruitlessly. Qatar, like Saudi at the 
beginning, promised Assad help with the condition that Assad stops the crackdown 
on rebels. Assad refused to listen; therefore, it came as no surprise to many to see a 
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shift in the Qatari policy, running out of patience with the Syrian regime.81 
Qatar in July 2011 cut its relations with Assad by closing its embassy in 
Damascus. Qatari Emir Hamad was among the first to call on the international 
community to militarily intervene in Syria in order to put an end to the bloodshed 
of the Syrian people.82 Even the Qatari based media outlet Al Jazeera that had once 
paid less coverage to the Syrian protests started to lunch anti-Assad propaganda 
immediately. In the meantime, the Qatari based Muslim brotherhood also released 
a fatwa or expert legal opinion, calling on protestors to stand up against the Syrian 
regime. Therefore, Qatar emerged as one of the driving forces behind the evolution 
of the Syrian crisis by pouring millions of dollars in helping the rebels in their fight 
against the regime.83 
Moreover, in regards to Turkey’s stance towards the Syrian Crisis, Ankara 
more or less had similar stance like its Arab counterparts. Ankara believed that 
Assad could be negotiated with conditions and offers. Ankara, similarly, like Qatar 
had maintained good relations with Syria. Their relations had improved to the point 
that the leaders of both countries were spending holiday’s together at a personal 
level in Turkey. Turkey, in the beginning, was ambitious as it had a dual strategy, 
the Turkish administration simultaneously supported the Syrian rebels while the 
same time it also advised the Syrian president by sending its envoy to Damascus in 
June 2011, urging Assad to fire his brother Maher known as the “thug in chief.” 
Turkey believed that its influence would force Assad to stop the crackdown on the 
rebels. Assad, after meeting with the Turkish envoy, started to withdraw his forces 
and tanks from Hama.  
However, the next day, Assad repositioned his troops, and he once again put 
his killing machine in action. Immediately after talks and meetings failed with 
Assad, ties were cut, and as a result, Erdogan threw his full support behind Syrian 
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protestors. On 23 August 2011, with Ankara’s blessings, the opposition SNC or 
Syrian National Council was established in Istanbul. Looking at the Syrian civil 
war from a regional dimension, Turkey had a significant role in the evolution of the 
Syrian crisis, and its frontier with Syria became a supply hub for rebels passing 
through the borders from Turkey to Syria.84 
                    While Iran is believed to be the staunchest ally of the Syrian regime, 
as the protests continued in Syria, according to Iran’s expert Jubin 
Goodarzai(2013), Iran emerged as a driving force, and it faced Hobson choice it 
either had to support Bashar or threw its support behind the rebels.’85 Therefore 
when the situation deteriorated and when the Syrian regime lost a massive swath of 
its territory, Iran became worried because the loss of Syria as an ally would mean a 
significant blow for Tehran that would effectively cut its access to its regional 
interests and ambitions. As a result, Iran, for the sake of its axis with Syria and its 
regional interests, chose Bashar over the rebels. Therefore, the course of events in 
Syria started to reveal that the Iranian attitude toward Syria proved the most 
decisive one. The Iranian policy, which has not indifferent throughout the crisis, is 
carefully elaborated on, in Chapter Three.  
2.3.3. International Dimensions  
 Indeed, Syria’s geopolitics have given strategic importance to both Regional 
and International powers, and with no doubt, the United States, the European 
Union, Russia, and China are having significant stakes in it. Therefore, the Syrian 
crisis presented these countries with both opportunities and challenges. There are 
also two confrontational fronts on the international dimensions of the Syrian Crisis. 
Russia, China, and Iran are supportive of the Bashar al Assad regime on the one 
hand, while on the opposite side, The US and The European Union countries such 
as Germany, France, and the UK are supporting the rebels. Due to such stark 
differences among International players, mediation and peace talks in Geneva have 
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repeatedly failed.86 
Overall, the Syrian war is played out mainly by the US and Russia. Both the 
USA and Russia have significantly contributed to the local actors by providing them 
financial and military equipment, which as a result, has kept local actors equipped 
to fight each other. Therefore, to unravel the puzzle, one must have first look at the 
Russian and US motives behind their involvement in Syria. Both countries have 
specific ambitions that will be expounded upon one by one in the following way. 
In the case of Russia's Stance towards the Syrian Crisis, Moscow generally 
demands to be treated as an equal partner by the US, in the international community. 
Russia’s involvement in Syria provided an opportunity to flex its muscles and show 
its strength and capacity as a major global player in resolving challenges.87 
Although various factors motivate Moscow’s engagement in the Syrian civil war, 
Moscow looks at the Middle East from different aspects, namely: Domestic, and 
Economic.  
 First and foremost, to start with the first motive of Russia, as Putin was 
making his comeback to the power, Moscow in December 2011, was hit by 
widespread of protests which according to the political analysts strengthened 
Russia’s position to engage in Middle East affairs particularly in Syria. According 
to Christopher Philips (2016), the popular unrest in Moscow and elsewhere in 
Russia put the Kremlin in fear that these protestors may get inspired by what was 
happening in the Middle East. Meanwhile, Russia also feared Islamist terrorism, 
almost 14% of the Russian population are Muslims, and Kremlin in the past had 
suffered several attacks from Islamist terrorists. Kremlin, therefore, feared 
spreading of ISIS violent interpretation of Islam both among the Muslims of North 
Caucasia and Central Asia. Hence, to avoid such threats, Russia was determined to 
throw its support behind the regime of Bashar al Assad.88  
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Lastly, from an Economic point of view, Russia has both Military and 
Energy-related aspirations in the region. According to Indrani Talukdar (2016), who 
claims that right after the fall of the Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi, Russia lost 
almost $ 4 Billion. Therefore, for Russia, to avoid the repetition of similar scenarios, 
it was essential to aid the Syrian regime. Russia has a significant market both in the 
Energy and Military equipment sectors. It maintains a foothold in the naval bases 
of Tartus and Khamim located in Syria. Although Syria is not a major buyer of 
Russian equipment, its location is what gives Syria an essential place in Russia’s 
Policy. Russian naval bases are believed to have helped Moscow in selling its 
military hardware and equipment. Sales of Russian military equipment, in 2015 hit 
a record of $14.5 billion.89 
When looking at all these factors elaborated above, one can say that 
Moscow, for the sake of its own interests, threw its full support behind the Syrian 
regime. Initially, Moscow indirectly supported the Syrian regime through 
diplomatic means; however, as soon as the situation deteriorated in Syria, Moscow 
was quick in to assume a more direct role in the crisis.  
Meanwhile, Russia’s international rival, The United States, to some extent 
along with some other international players, was locked in a bandwidth in which 
Washington could not adopt a confrontational policy towards Bashar al Assad 
regime. Initially, the United States believed that Assad could be negotiated with, 
and he could be encouraged to introduce reforms. According to the Washington Post 
(2011), Clinton, in an interview with CBS on March 27-2011 said: “There is a 
different leader in Syria now. Many of the members of Congress of both parties 
who have gone to Syria in recent months have said they believe he is a reformer.”90 
However, contrary to the US expectation, Bashar al Assad continued 
cracking down harshly on the peaceful protestors. Henceforward, the US retaliated 
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by punishing the Syrian regime with Economic Sanctions. On 29th April 2011, 
President Obama signed an official order designed to impose sanctions on President 
Bashar al Assad and his brother Maher al Assad and the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guards who had been advising the Syrian regime since the onset of the crisis. 
Moreover, the US further lost its patience when pro-Assad gangs attacked 
the US Embassy in Damascus in August 2011. In the same year, the US president 
called on Bashar al Assad to step aside and must lead a peaceful transition to the 
Syrian people. “The future of Syria must be determined by its people, but President 
Bashar al-Assad is standing in their way. His calls for dialogue and reform have 
rung hollow while he is imprisoning, torturing and slaughtering his own people. We 
have consistently said that President Assad must lead a democratic transition or get 
out of the way.”91  
Although, militarily, the US continued keeping a low profile on the ground 
by leading from behind strategy, which was a total reversal of the Bush policy 
toward the Middle East. The Obama administration, since succeeding, insisted on 
leading from behind. The US on the ground only supported numbers of rebels 
groups within Syria such as PYD (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat in Kurdish; Kurdish 
Democratic Union Party) and some FSA rebels to that extent.92 Therefore, in this 
sense, it could be said that the initial US policy in Syria was carried out by its 
regional and international rivals, notably Russia and Iran. Alternatively, in other 
words, the US low profile policy was outplayed by the staunchest supporters of the 
Syrian regime, Russia, and Iran. Both these countries could easily manipulate the 
situation in Syria, and as a result of their support for the Syrian regime, they further 
narrowed the chances of a peaceful transition of the Syrian regime to a more 
democratic one. 
In addition to Russia and the US role in the Evolution of the Syrian Crisis, 
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China’s role as an international must not be ignored, internationally the United 
States and Russia are not the only nations actively jostling in the Syrian crisis. In 
fact, another prominent nation playing a part is China as they too are following the 
conflict closely in view of their own interests. Both Beijing and Moscow have three 
times exercised their veto power in the UN Security Council to prevent the US 
proposals aimed to punish the Bashar al-Assad regime being accepted.93 
China has consistently sided with Russia in its proposed resolutions in the UN 
Security Council that protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian 
government, and since 2011, Beijing has teamed up with Moscow to veto four 
western-launched resolutions. Before this, Beijing had only vetoed ten times since 
1971, so we can see that China’s increased use of veto during the Syrian crisis, 
shows a more active role in influencing the Middle East in pursuit of its national 
interest. 
Beijing is concerned that the ongoing Syrian conflict could inspire and 
globalize domestic terrorists. The issue between the Chinese government and the 
persecution of its Muslim, Uyghur minority in the north-western Xinjiang province 
has led several retaliatory terrorist attacks in China and on Chinese citizens and 
interests overseas. Thousands of Chinese nationals, mainly Uyghurs, are thought to 
have joined Jabhat Fath al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra) in Syria and hundreds 
with the so-called Islamic State. China is not a member of the international coalition 
against terrorist groups in Syria, but Beijing is collaborating with Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, and other Middle Eastern governments on counterterrorism initiatives.94 
Watching the American military drain resources during the last decade of 
military expeditions in Iraq and Afghanistan, Beijing has wisely opted for minimum 
military engagement and is currently the only member of the UN Security Council 
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with no direct military activity in Syria. But with that said, China certainly has an 
indirect military influence on the Syrian conflict through the back door as one of 
Syria’s leading arms providers before the crisis broke out in 2011 and since then 
has leveraged the position of the Syrian army through political support on the UN 
Security Council.95 
 
2.4. Concluding Remarks  
Overall, Iran’s response to the upheavals in the region was, to a considerable 
degree, caught between its own interests and the interests of the region. Tehran 
holds seemingly contradictory stances toward North Africa and the Gulf and has a 
different position to that of its stance on uprisings in the Levant. Tehran sees the 
uprisings in North Africa and the Gulf as Islamic revolutions but in Syria, has 
completely disassociated itself from the rebellion and has designated it as a 
conspiracy of the West and Israel. Therefore, it is no surprise that many political 
commentators have accused Iran of double standards in relation to its inconsistent 
policies. It is widely regarded that Tehran’s foreign policy has more than a pinch of 
hypocrisy and that it is opportunistic in its response to the Arab spring by supporting 
the protests of North Africa and the Gulf, while at the same time denouncing the 
peaceful demonstrations of Syrians who in turn received the most brutal 
governmental retaliation. 
Henceforward, Syria hurtled into a bloody civil war that has made the 
country a chaotic battleground for both regional and international proxies. The 
problem of the crisis in Syria escalated beyond that of an individual state and 
became a regional proxy war and then a proxy war between major global powers. 
In this way, the dynamics of the Syria crisis escalated and diversified. The civil war 
dynamics within the country included the dynamics of a sectarian clash and affected 
the geopolitical rivalry between regional and international powers that were 
involved in the civil war as a proxy. 
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Chapter III 
 
IRAN’S POLICY DURING THE SYRIAN WAR 2011-2017 
Although the Arab spring presented the Islamic Republic of Iran with new 
opportunities, in the case of Syria, Tehran’s policy was caught off-guard. Regarding 
Iran's support for the Syrian regime, Iran has acted contrary to its foreign policy, by 
fighting the oppressed and helping the oppressors in contrast to its stance toward 
the other Arab revolutions. It accused the west and Israel of masterminding the 
unrest and denouncing the protestors as thugs. The Islamic Republic of Iran has 
played a crucial role in the Syrian crisis and along with Russia and China, it has 
thrown its support behind the Syrian president in his fight against the rebels. Syria 
plays a vital role in Iran's strategic ties in the Mediterranean and the Near East, and 
unlike the rest of the Arab world, Iran has pursued a different view based on the 
benefits of the developments in Syria. It is unacceptable for Tehran to lose one of 
its most essential allies in the heart of the Middle East. Iran’s stakes in Syria are 
significant, and since the beginning of the crisis in Syria, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran has vigorously pursued a supportive policy toward the regime of President 
Bashar al Assad. Bearing this in mind, this chapter aims to offer an account of the 
initial Iranian policy towards the Syrian war. 
 
3. INITIAL IRANIAN POLICY TOWARDS THE SYRIAN WAR 
 
The Iranian narrative of Islamic awakening and the Islamic revolution was 
challenged when the waves of the Arab Spring reached Syria. In the beginning, 
people started to rally against the regime, demanding the removal of President 
Bashar al Assad and his family. However, these anti-regime protests in Syria 
clashed with Iranian interests in the region. The Iranian officials continued to pay 
full attention to developments taking place in the region, while they simultaneously 
ignored talking about them publicly. Throughout the initial years, as it can be 
clearly seen from the speeches of the supreme leader in which not a single mention 
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of Syria was made, Iran was reluctant in making any statements about the Syrian 
crisis.96 
Therefore, it is believed that the Iranian narrative of Islamic awakening 
aimed at projecting itself as the champion of the oppressed, showed signs of flaws 
and double standards. Right after the Syrian crisis, political pundits thought that the 
Islamic Republic of Iran would acknowledge the Syrian crisis as a true and 
successful Islamic awakening. However, because of the Iranian’s alliance with 
Syria, no such thing happened, and as soon as the people started to protest against 
the regime, the Iranian leadership faced a major dilemma, failing to label the Syrian 
uprising as an Islamic uprising like those that took place elsewhere in the Middle 
East and North Africa. In the case of Syria, Tehran had two peculiar choices either 
it had to put its support behind the regime or throw its weight behind the rebels, 
which was not a preferable option.97  
3.1. Phase I: President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2011-2013) 
Iranian policy towards the Syrian war under the tenure of president 
Ahmadinejad was marked with silence. Likewise, the supreme leader, president 
Ahmadinejad opted silence, ignoring the Syrian crisis because it did not fit into the 
Iranian interpretation of the Islamic awakening narrative. Because of the 
developments taking place in Syria, Tehran silence over the Syrian crisis did not 
last long and it therefore gradually redefined its position by actively supporting the 
Syrian regime with political, financial, and military assistance. Tehran, in the first, 
believed that assisting Bashar al Assad would somehow resolve the crisis in a short 
time.  
               However, contrary to Iranian expectations, the Syrian crisis did not only 
continue but, in the meantime, they turned into further chaos, putting of President 
Ahmadinejad administration in an uncomfortable position. According to Jubin 
Goodarzi (2013), ever since the Syrian crisis, the anxiety of Tehran became so 
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evident, forcing Iranian diplomats to rethink their discourse on Syria. As a result, 
Tehran softened its policy and started to approach rebels groups for negotiations 
and discussions.98 Tehran’s rapprochement with the rebels simultaneously came 
along in the same line with the statements of the Iranian officials condemning the 
killings of the Syrian people by the regime forces. To recall an example for the 
statement made above, President Ahmadinejad declared that he is against all killing 
taking place in Syria and he also stated that he will act wisely in the case of Syria 
and will encourage the Syrian president to make fundamental reforms. Concerning 
the Iranian rapprochements with the rebels fictions, Mohammed Farouk Tayfour 
the deputy General of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in an interview with al Hayat 
said that through his Turkish connections, Iranian businessmen from Istanbul 
approached him in order to exchange their views about the Syrian conflict. To 
directly quote him, he said that: “[The Iranian businessmen] were willing to 
negotiate with [the idea of granting us] the whole government on the condition that 
Bashar al-Assad remains, president.”99 However, Assad remaining in the office as 
president was not at any mean acceptable for the rebels as they had already declared 
position that they could only talk with the Iranians if Assad steps down. However, 
due to the uncompromising stance of the rebels and Iranian officials, no deal could 
emerge.  
Therefore, as soon as the rapprochement with the Syrian rebels failed, 
Tehran came to view the Syrian crisis through a zero-sum game, where Iranian 
officials placed their narrative of the Syrian crisis on terms such as “Sedition” and 
“The Conspiracy of the West and Zionists.” These remarks of Tehran came along 
in the same line with the speeches of the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
Khamenei. Both the Supreme Leader and President Ahmadinejad called the crisis 
in Syria a seditious plan of Zionists and Western aimed at breaking the “Axis of 
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Resistance” between Iran and Syria. President Ahmadinejad stated that Iran would 
oppose any interference in the domestic affairs of Syria, and he also accused Israel 
and the West taking advantage of the situation in Syria.100  
Moreover, as the turmoil in Syrian entered into a new phase of proxy 
warfare, consequently Tehran during the years of 2011 and 2012 intensified its 
financial and military support to the Syrian regime. On the one hand, regional 
Player such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, including other Muslim countries decided 
to throw their support behind the rebels, while on the other hand, Iran and Hezbollah 
put their support behind the Syrian regime. Gulf countries and Turkey continued 
providing rebels with material and financial assistance and vice versa Iran along 
with Russia continued to ship arms to the Syrian regime while at the same time 
Moscow and China diplomatically continued their efforts at blocking any resolution 
laying groundwork for a foreign military intervention in Syria.  
3.2. Phase II: President Hassan Rouhani (2013-2017) 
When in 2013, the reformist president Hassan Rouhani took power hopes 
were revived due to his reformists’, and pragmatic stance. It was expected that the 
new pragmatic president Hassan Rouhani would pursue a different course of policy 
toward the Syrian civil war. Although Rouhani did not officially disclose his 
position toward Syria, however, in July 2013 it was reported by some media outlets 
and Iranian officials that President Rouhani was working on a plan to encourage 
President Assad and the Syrian opposition to sit for peace talks. Moreover, some 
close associates of Rouhani also stated that the Iranian president was evaluating the 
option of replacing Bashar al Assad with a “Syrian Karzai” in the form of a Sunni 
Arab who would be acceptable to all parties including the regional and trans-
regional players.101 
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Nonetheless, Rouhani’s efforts were ineffective because, at the time when 
Rouhani took power, Iran was heavily suffering from economic blowbacks and 
sanctions. According to Shahram Akbarzadeh & Dara Conduit (2016), Rouhani’s 
policy toward Syria was caught off-guard at the time of sanctions. Iran was isolated 
due to the sanctions imposed by the international community and therefore 
President Hassan Rouhani, for the sake of his interests and as a way to move 
forward, adopted a more calm and diplomatic approach toward the war in Syria.102 
Thereafter, Iran adopted a two-spate policy at the same time, Tehran, on the 
one hand, continued assisting the Syrian military by keeping its boots on the ground 
in coordination with its allies, while on the other hand, Tehran increased its 
diplomatic efforts in solving the Syrian Crisis. Henceforward, Rouhani’s 
administration came up with its own four-point peace plan which included: “an 
immediate ceasefire; constitutional reforms to safeguard Syrian minorities; free and 
internationally supervised elections; and the formation of a national unity 
government based on new constitutional institutions.”103 However, all these 
attempts were futile and fell by the wayside.  
In the meantime, as the new developments were taking place in 2014, Iran 
needed to adopt a new narrative in its foreign policy discourse towards Syria. The 
meteoric rise of ISIS brought sea changes in the foreign policy discourse of regional 
and international actors as well as in the Iranian discourse of its policy toward Syria. 
As the conflict escalated and when ISIS launched large scale attacks on Baghdad 
and Damascus reaching almost a few kilometers from the Iraqi capital. This incident 
had a seismic impact in Iran with Iran able to use it to ignite both Shia and 
nationalist sentiment, drumming up public support in Syria against the Takfiri and 
Daesh groups. It can be seen that while the military operations of Iran in Syria had 
unifying effects at home, this may be well have been focused on to deliberately 
capture the attention of the Iranian public. Iran, in its new discourse, saw the 
protection of Shiite sites as an important holy duty. By 2015 the number of Iranian 
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deaths in Syria exceeded one thousand, and the regime barely gave this fact any 
airtime in the media, as a way to avoid angering the masses, then the rise of Takfiri 
groups and their attacks in Iran began to stimulate Iran’s religious rhetoric against 
their enemies.104 
Meanwhile, Iran officially sanctified its efforts as fighting terrorism in Syria 
while viewing this all through the esoteric lenses of its own religious transcendent 
end-game narrative. The sectarian justification has been instrumental in recruiting 
fighters from other countries, on top of urging its own citizens to volunteer to 
defend the holy Shiite shrines with its international network; Iran has recruited 
Shiites from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and neighboring Iraq.  
3.3. Dimensions of Iranian Strategy towards Syria 
 Iran's position in Syria is quite clear. Iran will do its best to keep its ally 
in power; however, for the sake of its precautions, Tehran has taken one step further 
by deploying Shiite and Alawite proxies to Syria. Therefore, looking at the 
unfolding of events, a very pragmatic and strategic game can be seen being played, 
between these two allied regimes. It affirms that the two nations have a mutually 
beneficial, opportunistic relationship, which necessitates jumping to the aid of each 
other; hence, Iran’s unwavering propping up of the Syrian regime throughout the 
current crisis.  
 Therefore, Tehran, for the sake of its ally, has adopted a multifaceted 
strategy which includes extensive, expensive, and integrated efforts. Initially 
Tehran supported the Syrian regime financially right after the breakout of the Civil 
War, and gradually it extended its military assistance first in the form of Limited 
Advisory Missions (2011-2012),  Training, Advice and Assist Missions (September 
2012- 2015) and in the later stages when the situation further escalated Tehran took 
more active role in directly engaging in the Syrian crisis coinciding with 
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(September 2015- January 2017). Tehran’s direct intervention in Syria, as a result, 
has paid off, and Assad seems to be winning enormous gains against the rebels. As 
of April 2018, the Assad regime had regained control of most of its territory that 
once had been in the hands of the opposition. All this would have never been 
possible without direct intervention and assistance from Iran. 
 
3.3.1. Financial Assistance 
 Firstly, after the 2011 protests, the Syrian economy sustained huge loses 
and saw a complete decline. Every single sector of the Syrian economy was affected 
even interrupting the whole industry. As the Syrian crisis turned violent, the 
international community was quick in imposing sanctions on the Syrian regime. 
The European Union, which had once been the biggest buyer of Syrian crude oil, 
stopped doing business with Syria. Regime-affiliated banks and petroleum 
companies were blacklisted and banned from interacting with the outside business 
world.105 
         However, when the situation escalated in 2013, Syria lost its major 
economic powerhouses of Damascus and Aleppo. Damascus and Aleppo accounted 
for almost 50 percent of Syria’s manufacturing sector. The expansion of the 
violence led to a collapse of industry in both cities with most companies either being 
looted or destroyed, and as a consequence, most of the Middle-Class industrialists 
were either forced to migrate, or they took their capital with them to the neighboring 
countries, notably to The Republic of Turkey.  
         Moreover, the regime also lost possession of the oil refinery and grain 
sources to the opposition forces. Syria was in the chaos of war, and financially, it 
had sustained enormous injuries. Although there is no official report available about 
the decline in the Syrian economy, it is concluded that the Syrian economy between 
the years of 2011-2013 nosedived and unemployment reached 50 percent and half 
of the population remained in severe poverty. As a result, it became the second 
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smallest economy in the Arab world with a nominal GDP of 30 billion dollars after 
Bahrain with 28$ billion.106 
         Despite all these blowbacks and losses, the Syrian economy stood firm, 
but the question arises here, how could the Syrian economy possibly withstand all 
the sanctions and internal conflict? The answer to the question lies in Iran’s 
financial support to the Assad regime. Tehran’s financial grants of billions of 
dollars saved Bashar al Assad regime from complete economic collapse.     
 According to Bloomberg citing the United Nations Representative for 
Syria, Staffan de Mistura, "Iran spends roughly between $6 billion to $35 billion 
annually on the administration of Bashar al-Assad."107 Although no accurate reports 
are available, according to most of the scholars, Iranian spending in Syria reached 
between $6 to $35 billion per year, including all the civil and non-civil aides.108 
     Financially Tehran has been one of the main backers of the Syrian 
regime. Although in the past both countries have never done business together on a 
large scale, however, with the start of the war, business relations increased, and 
Tehran became one of the biggest trade partners of Syria even interestingly both 
signing a free trade agreement to improve bilateral trade from $700 million to $24 
billion.  In July 2011, it was reported that Iran was considering financial assistance 
approved by Khamenei with the amount of $5.2 billion in the form of cash and oil 
supplies to the Syrian regime. This package included three months of loans worth 
$1.5 billion that were granted to the Syrian regime immediately. The package also 
comprised a provision of 290,000 barrels of oil per day to the Syrian regime.109 
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 Again, in January 2013, during a visit by the Syrian Prime Minister Wael 
al-Halki, Tehran agreed to deposit $500 million into Syria’s central bank to help 
Assad to prop up his local currency. Moreover, in July both countries inked a deal 
worth of $4.6 billion of credits in line assistance to the Syrian regime. The first 
batch of these credits with the worth of $1billion was intended to fund imports of 
the Syrian government and the second batch with an additional sum of $3.6 billion 
in line credits was dedicated for the purchase of petroleum and oil products.110 
 Furthermore, in an interview in June 2013 with The Financial Times, the 
Syrian deputy minister for oil said that Iran would continue granting monthly oil 
aids worth of $500m and would extend credit lines to the Syrian regime.5 Syria in 
December 2013 issued tenders of food with 150,000 tons of sugar, 50,000 tons of 
rice, 25,000 tons of flour and a wide range of other food using the Iranian credit 
line. According to Syria’s General Foreign Trade Organization (GFTO), in most of 
these tenders, the payment would come from the Iranian credit and would be paid 
through the Commercial Bank of Syria and the Export Development Bank of 
Iran.111 
 Aside from food aid, Iran also provided the Syrian regime with cheap oil, 
mainly for military purposes. When in 2013 the international community, primarily 
the EU stopped buying crude oil from the Syrian regime, Tehran stepped up and 
helped its ally by taking the Syrian crude oil, disguise its origin and sell it on the 
international market. However, when Syria lost control of the entirety of its oil 
wells, Tehran helped the Syrian regime with cheap oil from Iraq in order to 
overcome the oil shortages. As of 2103, the Reuters Agency revealed that Tehran 
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had transported millions of barrels of Iraqi cheap crude oil as part of an under the 
radar deal through Lebanese and Egyptian trading companies.112 
 Overall, it is difficult to gauge the exact amount of money that Iran has 
been spending in Syria because Iranian financial assistance includes a variety of 
economic aid such as direct cash, credits in line, subsidized oil, and military grants. 
However, most of the reports so far regarding Iranian spending in Syria suggest that 
Iran has been spending roughly between $6 billion and $16 billion in Syria.   
   3.3.2. Limited Advisory Mission (2011-2012)  
 Among Tehran second batch of aid to the Syrian regime includes military 
deployment in the form of a limited advisory role. As the situation in Syria went 
beyond the control of Bashar Al Assad, the Iranian regime saw it as their 
responsibility to help their ally by dispatching the Law Enforcement personnel 
including the Islamic Revolution Guards Force both from the IRGC-GF, IRGC-QF 
forces on a Limited Advisory Mission. Given their successful record, the IRGC was 
successful in aiding the Syrian regime in repressing the protests throughout Syria.  
As in the early days, when the regime sought to suppress the protesters, the 
need for Iranian intelligence support became a must. The Iranian Intelligence 
organizations were violently effective in dispersing the protestors by using the same 
tactics which they had once used in Iran against the “Green Movement’’ in 2009. 
Therefore, several Iranian intelligence entities such as the Intelligence Protection 
Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Law Enforcement Forces, 
the ministry of intelligence security and Iranian electronic industries played an 
essential role in providing Assad with considerable intelligence information. The 
aids of Iranian intelligence to the Syrian regime included “electronic surveillance 
systems, technology designed to disrupt efforts by protesters and Iranian-made 
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drones for overhead surveillance,”113 said a US official in an interview with 
Reuters. Iranian intelligence engagement in Syria became evident when in April 
2011, the head of the Law Enforcement Forces Ahmad Reza Radan, traveled to 
Syria to meet the Syrian intelligence General Intelligence Directorate (GID). He 
apparently provided “expertise to aid in the Syrian government in its crackdown on 
the Syrian people.”114  
 In addition to the deployment of intelligence personnel, Tehran also 
provided Syria with its elite brigades of IRGC-GF and IRGC-QF. However, among 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Forces, the IRGC-QF played a more critical role 
in helping Assad’s grip on to the power. IRGC-QF, as an external arm of the Iranian 
regime, is mainly responsible for Tehran’s external and clandestine operation 
abroad. Therefore, it was no surprise to see Qasim Suleimani taking the Iranian 
policy towards Syria in his hand. The prominent General joined the IRGC forces 
during the Iran-Iraq war as an ordinary soldier, but as soon as the war ended, he 
was promoted to the rank of IRGC extraterritorial Quds forces commander. Despite 
his initial cooperation with the US during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
Suleimani would make his name as a crucial planner of the attacks against US 
forces by sponsoring Shiite-Sunni proxies in their fight against the Americans in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.115 
  Therefore, he was tasked to apply his skills in Syria in order to help 
Bashar al Assad hold onto the power. Although at first Iran continuously rejected 
IRGC presence in Syria however, the extent of Quds forces involvement in Syria 
became evident when in February 2013, an Iranian Brigadier General Hassan 
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Shatari was killed on his way to Beirut from Syria. Hassan Shatari was one of a 
high ranking IRGC official who was operating secretly in Syria particularly in 
Aleppo. Therefore, the death of Shatari showed the Quds forces high-level of 
involvement in Syria.116 
Moreover, likewise, its sister wing the IRGC Ground forces which are 
mainly responsible for the domestic security of Iran were also dispatched to Syria 
alongside the IRCG-QF forces. Most of the cadets from the IRGC ground forces 
hails from the border provinces of Iran, and they have significant experiences in 
counterinsurgencies that were an excellent remedy for the Assad regime. Therefore, 
as the IRGC-GF were critical in Syria, and they activated from the operation rooms 
far from the front lines by advising the Assad military personnel with their 
counterinsurgency and warfare techniques.117  
3.3.3. TAA (Train, Advice, and Assist Mission September 2012-2015)  
In the finishing days of 2012, when Assad’s fortune at the battleground 
declined, Tehran adopted a TAA strategy by increasing numbers of its IRCG 
military personnel to train, advice and assist various proxy groups and regime 
forces. Iran’s support of these groups lies with the formula of Train, Advice, and 
Assist (TAA Strategy). The strategy is primarily aimed at providing an external 
force with the training, advising, and assisting during military operations. 
According to Nicholas Hargreaves (2018) for the past few decades, the TAA 
strategy has become the seal mark of asymmetrical or proxy war. It is an excellent 
choice of engagement for countries who want to pursue a high-stake engagement 
in the war without any direct military interference. It is also cost-effective in 
reducing the blood spill and financial expenses.118  
Therefore, at the time, the TAA strategy perfectly fit the Iranian strategy for 
supporting Bashar al Assad in Syria. As of 2012 and 2014, Tehran had shifted to 
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TAA strategy by deploying various Shiite groups from across the world. Iran has 
so far trained, assisted, and advised multiple proxy groups through its highly trained 
IRGC forces. The deployment of these Shiite militia and proxy groups stem from 
the protection of the Shiite shrines in Damascus. However, contrary to their 
narrative of protecting the Shiite sites, these Shiite paramilitaries and proxies have 
instead adopted an active role in the frontlines. These Proxies that are going to be 
elaborated in the following way are believed to be part of Iran’s multifaceted 
strategy for rescuing Bashar al Assad regime in Syria. They are basically divided 
into two major categories, in the first categories are the highly combat professional 
militias such as Hezbollah and the Iraqi Shiites while in the second category other 
Shiites such as the Afghani Fatimyon, Pakistani Zynabyoon and Shiites from 
Yemen are placed. These Shiite fighters from both factions have played a vital role 
in combat operations and are mostly deployed in the North from Hama to Idlib and 
in the South from Derra to Damascus. 
 Firstly, Lebanese Hezbollah, as one of the leading groups from the first 
category, led by Hassan Nasrallah, has one of the biggest deployments of fighters 
on a non-state level in Syria. Hezbollah initially burst onto the scene in late 2012 
under the guise of protecting the Shiite holy sites and shrines. After that, like the 
IRCG forces, Hezbollah started to aid Assad with advisory roles. However, when 
in late 2012, Assad’s luck in the war started to wane, the Lebanese Hezbollah in 
collaboration with the IRCG forces engaged in a more active role. Since then, LH 
has provided Bashar al Assad with an increasing level of assistance, it has also 
ensured to keep up the supply of Iranian arms shipments to Syria. LH forces 
alongside the IRCG forces have trained and assisted regime forces for the sake of 
their interests.  
Hezbollah forces are vital to the durability of the Syrian regime, and they 
are better suited to the war in Syria for several reasons; their native Arabic language 
and infantry experience makes them better suited to the Syrian community than the 
Persians fighting in Syria. Meanwhile, they are also a perfect supplement for the 
Syrian army who lack asymmetrical techniques. Hezbollah’s engagement in Syria 
 69 
 
includes counter sniper operations, joint clearing operation, route clearing, and 
direct military engagement on the frontline.119 As of their high-level warfare 
capabilities, Hizbollah has effectively trained, advised, and assisted pro-regime 
forces mostly the Shiites proxies both in Syria and Iraq. Some of these proxies 
trained by the Hizbollah are Quwat al Ridha, Al-Ghaliboun, Liwa al-Imam al-Baqir 
(or Baqir Brigade), who operate in different parts of Syria.120 
Moreover, Hezbollah expanded its combats engagement in mid-February 
2013, when Hezbollah along with the Syrian regime and pro-regime militia 
launched a ground offensive against the rebels on Al-Qusayr. Al-Qusayr is primary 
a Sunni populated town of Homs located on the Lebanese border. The town has had 
strategic importance, and because of its location, it connects Damascus with the 
coastal provinces as well as to the village Bekaa valley. The rebel’s seizure of the 
town not only threatened major strategic routes, but it also targeted Assad’s main 
lines of communication with the other coastal towns. The city’s strategic location 
in the vicinity of the Lebanese border turned into a major smuggling point of 
weapons for rebels. Therefore, in order to cut the primary lifeline of the rebels, 
Hezbollah in collaboration with the Syrian regime launched a large-scale offensive 
aimed at taking back the control of the town from the hands of the rebels.121 
Despite the fact LH forces are mainly deployed on the border areas between 
Syria and Lebanon however, Western officials suggest that Hezbollah has also 
deployed some of its forces deep into the other parts of Syria, such as Homs and 
Damascus and the governorate of Deir al-Zour in the Middle Euphrates River 
Valley. Though there is no precise data available about Hezbollah losses in Syria, 
it is believed that Hezbollah has as many as 7000 to 10000 fighters in Syria.122 
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Like Iran, Hezbollah too despite its high losses, views the Syrian war being 
as conspiracy plan of the West and Israel against the Axis of Resistance. Therefore, 
Lebanese Hezbollah does not have any intention of leaving Syria until it achieves 
victory, as it was noted in the remarks of Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah that, 
“We will continue this battle until the end, and we are proud of our martyrs in Syria 
and whoever bargains on our tiredness will lose.”123 In another interview with the 
Fars news agency in 2015, The Hezbollah executive committee head, Nabil 
Qawooq was quoted as saying, “We will finish the war in Syria. We insist on 
defeating the terrorists and gaining victory against the Takfiri plots in Syria in a 
move to support Lebanon because if Syria turns into a center or passage for ISIL 
and other terrorist groups, they will not show mercy to Lebanon either.” 124 
In addition to Lebanese Hezbollah, Tehran has also recruited Iraqi Shiite 
militias in the Syrian frontlines. Iraqi Shiite fighters Like Hezbollah are believed to 
have significantly helped the Syrian regime in their fight against the rebels. The 
Iraqi Shiite paramilitaries also have several advantages over the non-Arabic 
speaking Shiite proxies, they are native speakers of Arabic, and meanwhile, their 
asymmetrical experiences have helped the Syrian army in their fight against 
opposition forces.125 
Moreover, most of these Iraqi Shiite proxies are deployed in the South and 
North of Syria, particularly in Derra and Aleppo close to the Iraqi border. According 
to the New York Times, the Iraqi Shiite proxies emerged as the most potent combat 
partner of IRCG-QF in the Syrian unrest. They, together with Hezbollah, trained, 
and assisted other Shiite proxies from across the world, such as Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Yemen.  
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Alongside major Shiite militias, Tehran IRCG forces have also conscripted 
hundreds of Shiite fighters from Yemen, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. These groups 
of the Iranian proxies are lay in the second category of the Iranian proxies. Contrary 
to the fighters from the first category, these Shiites proxies lack major warfare 
techniques they, therefore, undergo two stages of training in Syria. First, they 
receive military training from the IRCG, LH, and the Iraqi proxies then in the 
second stage, they are put into action for a short period of time in the frontlines. 
Upon finishing both stages, they are sent back to their home countries for special 
purposes. These groups of proxies include Shiites particularly from Afghanistan 
(The Fatimyoon Brigade), Pakistan (The Pakistani Zeinabiyoun Brigade) and the 
Houthi militia.126  
Among the second category of the Shiite militias, The Fatimyoon brigade 
is believed to be the second largest in number after the Lebanese Hezbollah. The 
Afghani contingents fighting in Syria are significant in Iran’s multifaceted policy 
of saving Bashar al Assad. The brigade pulls most of its members from the 
undocumented Afghan refugees of the Hazara Shiite community in Iran which 
numbers almost 3 million. A report by the Washington post in 2018 claimed that 
Shiite fighters of Hazara Fatimyoon brigades are rewarded with various luring 
incentives including salaries of $500 to $700 per month, a legal residence permit 
and a housing permit.127 
  In an interview on BBC Persian with an ex-fighter of the Afghan Fatimyoon 
brigade who fled to Europe with the Syrian refuges admits that before their 
deployment to Syria, they received basic training and then were airlifted by Mahan 
Air to the frontlines in Syria.  
Therefore, these Afghan Hazaras are soldiers in someone else’s war pushed 
by economic grief and religious loyalty. Although no exact numbers of the Afghan 
Hazara fighting in Syria can be known, it is believed that there are between 5000 
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and 12000 Afghans fighting in Syria under the command of IRGC forces.128 
Furthermore, reports suggest that these Afghan Hazara fighters are considered to 
be Iran’s long-term investment for its interest in Afghanistan. The rise of ISIS and 
the fear of the US influence in Afghanistan is what the Iranian regime takes as a 
serious threat to its national security. Therefore, it is believed that Iran is playing a 
double game by killing two birds with one stone. It can be said that Iran uses Syria 
as a training ground for these Afghans Shiite fighters while at the same time, Tehran 
uses them in their strategy for saving Assad.129 
Moreover, another least known Shiite group from the second category, 
fighting in Syria is the Pakistani Zeinabiyoun Brigade led by Seyed Abbas Mousavi 
who keeps a low profile due to threats posed by the Pakistani Inter-Service 
Intelligence agency or ISI. The militia is believed to have direct ties with the Iranian 
IRCG forces.130 Just like other proxies, IRGC conscripted the Pakistani Shiite 
fighters to Syria as part of the proxies protecting the holy Shiites shrines. 
According to the Fars news agency, after the systematic prosecution of the 
Shiite minorities in Pakistan, the IRCG forces formed the Zeinabiyoun Brigade to 
protect the Shiite in Pakistan. Therefore, Tehran recruited as many of these Shiites 
in Syria to not only militarily train them while at the same time, Tehran uses them 
in strengthening the defensive line of the Assad forces.131 
Moreover, the last group of Shiites militias amongst the second category are 
the Yemenites Zaidi’s who alike the Afghani and Pakistani Shiites go through 
similar kind of process and military training. Upon completing the two stages, the 
Houthis are sent back to their home in order to keep up the war against Saudi 
collation forces.132 
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3.3.4. The Rise of ISIS-2014  
The dramatic rise of ISIS brought about sea changes and shaped the 
geopolitical landscape in the Middle East. ISIS or The Islamic State of Iraq and 
Sham reshaped regional dynamics, which had an enormous impact on Iranian 
military engagement abroad. Along with the rise of ISIS came a new chapter in the 
Syrian crisis and Iran’s approach to it. Therefore, it is believed that the rise of ISIS 
in 2014 presented Iran with both gains and challenges. In the short-term, Iran gained 
from the rise of ISIS. Following shadowy Iranian engagement in Syria, it was an 
opportunity for the IRGC forces to change their image in the eyes of the Iranian 
people who had been criticizing Iran’s shadowy war in Syria. While in the long run, 
the rise of ISIS had serious consequences for Iran, both in Syria and in Iraq. The 
swift advance of ISIS in the Iraqi cities of Ramadi and Fallujah was such a shock 
that even the American style equipped army could not prevent their advance 
towards Baghdad. ISIS, without facing any resistance from the Iraqi army gained 
control of Mosul, and its forces pushed down to the Tigris river valley. The rapid 
advance of ISIS toward Baghdad forced a change in the Iranian leaders’ attitude 
toward the developments in Iraq.133  
Historically Iraq has been a foe, but recently it became a strategic and 
regional ally, after the withdrawal of the American forces in 2011. Iran maintained 
close relations with the predominantly Shiite government of Baghdad. For Tehran, 
Iraq meant a lot, for a number of reasons, firstly, after the outbreak of the Syrian 
civil war in 2011, Iraqi airspace became a major air supply route for the Syrian 
regime.134 It is estimated that Iran IRGC has taken thousands of flights to Damascus 
through Iraqi the airspace. These flights are alleged to have been carrying military 
Personal of IRGC and foreign proxies to the Syrian frontlines. Secondly, Iraq from 
the start of 2011 has been a major supplier of the Shiite fighters to the Assad regime. 
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Unlike other Shiite fighters, the Iraqi Shiites fighters are more skilled in an 
unconventional war, and they have played a key role in combating the rebels in 
Syria. However, as ISIS was making rapid gains in Iraq, these militias or 
mercenaries had to leave the Syrian frontlines to get back to Iraq in order to fight 
the ISIS at their home.  
The withdrawal of the Iraqi Shiites presented the Syrian regime with 
fighters shortages on the frontline. Therefore, the rapid rise of ISIS had a direct 
effect on Iranian efforts in fighting against the rebels in Syria. In Syria, the regime 
was almost on the verge collapse. Syria lost its major urban cities, including its 
main economic hub to ISIS. By August 2015, the regime was hanging on to control 
of a small swath of land, almost one-sixth of its territories.   
3.3.5. Direct Engagement (September 2015-January 2017)  
The rapid advance of ISIS towards Bagdad and Syria was a total game 
changer triggering a direct military engagement from the Iranian side.  As Iranian 
efforts became in vain, Tehran approached Russian in September 2015 and in the 
same year on September 30, Russia launched its first military aerial campaign in 
Syria. The Russian entry into the Syrian war was secured as part of Suleiman's 
efforts. Suleimani, in July, paid several visits to Moscow; he unfurled a map of 
Syria to the Russians, showing Assad’s losses. Senior regional sources recounted 
that “Suleimani put the map of Syria on the table. The Russians were very alarmed 
and felt matters were in steep decline and that there were real dangers to the regime. 
The Iranians assured them there is still the possibility to reclaim the initiative. At 
that time, Suleimani played a role in assuring them that we have not lost all our 
cards.”135 
Therefore, Major General Qasim Suleimani’s visit to Moscow is reckoned 
as the first step of encouraging Russian intervention in Syria which as a result 
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created a new Iranian-Russian alliance that completely reshaped the course of the 
Syrian War. According to a report by Reuters, after Suleimani guaranteed Russian 
entry into the Syrian War, Iran subsequently deployed hundreds of IRGC-GF 
Ground forces including units specialized in weaponry and assault operations, 
infantry and reconnaissance units to Syria, this time not as advisors but as direct 
combatants in support of Assad. Although many high-ranking Iranian officials 
rejected Iranian troops and IRGC-GF deployment in Syria, but it was later 
confirmed by some senior regional officials that Iran had actually deployed forces 
to Syria.136 
In the meantime, the direct intervention of the Iranian forces could also be 
observed from the causalities that took place before and after the Russian 
intervention. before October 2015, the bulk of causalities only belonged to one 
company or battalion. However, following the Russian intervention, Iranian forces 
casualties dramatically increased, and they were interestingly not only limited to 
one brigade but indeed the bulk of the deaths came from various units of the Iranian 
forces throughout Syria. If had Iran deployed one battalion, the bulk of the death 
toll would have been alone from the units or battalion deployed. Therefore, the 
concentration of losses of the small number of causalities from every unit suggested 
that Iran had also developed a new model for expeditionary forces shifting from 
TAA limited advisory policy to a more hybrid unconventional policy.137 
Moreover, Iran, following the Russian intervention, developed a unified 
command structure aimed at unifying all the expeditionary and IRGC-QF- GF 
forces under one chain of command. Iran embedded hundreds of its newly deployed 
soldiers and IRGC military officers from various units with the proxies and 
expeditionary forces for a short period of time. These units appeared to have stayed 
in the battleground until being replaced by the newly arrived forces. Among those 
embedded with the proxies, were military officers from various units of the army, 
IRGC-QF-GF, Basij forces with the ranks of lieutenants, and officers who in the 
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battlefields acted as battalion commanders for the proxy forces. Moreover, these 
battalion commanders in charge were reporting to the General command of IRGC 
forces that ends with Major General Qasim Suleimani and Major General Pakpour. 
This hierarchal chain of command allowed IRGC to direct all of its proxies and 
expeditionary forces as conventional combat forces, thus making it easy for the 
IRGC to command all of them under one order. Therefore, every unit of Iranian 
forces seemed to have sustained losses while being on deployment in Syria. By 
taking the above mention hypothesis, it could be said that Iran, following the 
Russian intervention, increased its efforts by actively jumping into the middle of 
the battlefield.138 
3.4. Concluding Remarks 
When the Syrian uprising first broke out, the Iranians were already vocal in 
support of similar uprisings in the region and were keen to refer to them using 
glorious phrases such as ‘Islamic Awakening,’ but this was not extended to the 
Syrian uprising. This chapter concludes that there was a total lack of official Iranian 
foreign policy on Syria at the time the conflict started, and the reason for this is put 
forward as the close nature of the relationship between Tehran and Damascus and 
the possibility that Iran’s owns agenda could be under threat if it supported regime 
change in Syria. 
What is demonstrated throughout this study, is that Iran’s foreign policy 
since the advent of the Islamic revolution being concentrated on a neorealist and 
pragmatic approach to the crisis in Syria. The core objective of Iranian foreign 
policy through a pragmatic perspective has been survival in the anarchic 
international system by maximizing its interests. Therefore, to make sure, at all 
costs, that the Bashar Assad’s government is not toppled, Iran will do its utmost to 
save the regime of Bashar al Assad and as elaborated in the chapter Iranian support 
for the Assad regime has been vital. Therefore, in order to keep Assad in power, 
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Tehran, in its strategy, has adopted a multifaceted strategy that includes extensive, 
expensive, and integrated efforts.  
Despite colossal material and human loss, Tehran remained confident in its 
strategy of saving Bashar al Assad. Its direct intervention in Syria has paid off, and 
Assad seems to be getting enormous gains against the rebels. As of April 2018, the 
Assad regime had gained control of almost the majority of its territory that once 
had been in the hands of the rebel opposition. All this would have never been 
possible without direct Iranian intervention.  
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Chapter VI 
IMPACT OF THE SYRIAN WAR ON IRANIAN POLITICS 
 After eight years of war in Syria, Iran has been playing an important role 
in keeping Bashar al Assad’s hold onto the power. In Syria, Iranian stakes are high, 
that is why Iran, along with Russia, put their weight behind the Assad regime in his 
fight against the rebels. With the duo support, Assad has gained a great momentum 
against the rebels by reclaiming the control of major parts of Syria. Therefore, a 
consensus of key characters from the leaders within military and political personal 
could be said to be at the core of Islamic republic multi-layered policy towards 
Syria. With Iran’s policy in Syria inevitably colored by a wide range of actors, it 
can be clearly observed that domestic’s matters heavily shape both Iranian’s 
security concerns and its approach in Syria. Therefore, the Syrian War is arguably 
the most decisive war in Iranian history. Many remained supportive of the military 
engagement to save Bashar al Assad from the rebels. However, there were other 
politicians who believed Iran had no business in Syria. Mainly the hardliners camp 
believes that Syria is the key to containing foothold in the region. There were 
occasional opposition voices from the reformists who, for various reasons, 
questioned Iran’s Syria policy and therefore, they sought criticism from the 
Hardliners front.  
Before addressing to the various themes of debates among political elites in 
Iran, the thesis will shed light on major motivations played important role reshaping 
the Iranian Policy towards the Syrian War. In the later phase, the chapter aims at 
offering an account of debates over Iranian policy in Syria through the lens of both 
the reformists and hardliners. Moreover, this chapter also looks at two different 
phases of the Syrian crisis. Firstly, by giving some idea about the relations between 
the previous President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and neighboring Syria and then on 
to President Hassan Rouhani Era and the challenges he faced. The argument will 
be put forward that Reformists camp, even though winning two consecutive 
elections, failed to change the hardliners Syria’s policy.   
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4. Major Motivations reshaping Iran’s Policy towards the Syrian War  
Among one of Iran's main priorities in Syria is to keep the political weight 
and balance of the region. Over the course of the Syrian crisis, Iran's regional rival 
powers, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia are relatively dissatisfied with the current 
situation and are demanding a change in the balance of regional power. Iran regards 
the situation in Syria through the lens of a zero-sum game or game theory. The 
concept of the zero-sum game explains the situation in which players either win or 
lose their interests against each other. Therefore, the concept of the zero-sum game 
significantly fits the case of Syria.  Regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, 
and Qatar are practically engaged in financial, and arms support to opposition 
groups in Syria, and they hope to pave the way for the fall of Assad. Meanwhile, 
for Iran, the fall of Assad would not only deprive Tehran of Lebanon but would 
also place Iraq on the red line of Iran's new rift.139 In addition to Saudi Arabia's 
interests, Turkey is also present in northern Iraq, whose policies are not in line with 
Iran. In this way, Jubin Goodarzai, in his article, “Iran: Syria as the first line of 
defense (2013),” calls Syria as the first line of defense for Iran.140  The fall of Syria 
would also expose the western borders of Iraq to the pressure of the new Syrian 
government, which would terminate a strategic alliance with Iran and join the 
Arabian axis. 
Shortly in Syria, on one side for Iran to keep the power balance, it is 
essential to provide the Syrian regime with the necessary support. However, on the 
other hand, the Saudis, Qatar, and Turkey have been supportive of the rebels, and 
they demand the ouster of Bashar al Assad. Therefore, with no doubt, a high 
intensity of competition is seen among these regional foes. If one loses the other 
wins and vice versa for Iran, if Assad falls, the new regime would be dependent on 
Sunni regional or trans-national alliances which would have a hostile stance toward 
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Tehran.141 In other words, a shift in power in Syria would mean another loop in the 
chain of the regional rivals of Iran and the loss of a regional strategic alliance. 
 Secondly, with respect to Syria’s geopolitical importance, Iranian 
officials consider Syria vital for their security in the region. Tehran’s alliance with 
Damascus has provided Iran with numerous privileges. The alliance, being termed 
as an “Axis of Resistance,” has given Tehran a strategic foothold in the region. 
Tehran considers Syria as a strategic gateway and as a bulwark against the Israeli 
government and most importantly as a conduit to its Lebanese mercenary, the 
Hezbollah.142 Also, the country can be a significant route to Europe through the 
Banias and Tartus on the Mediterranean coast, for the export of Iranian oil and 
gas.143 
 Furthermore, Hezbollah is the crown jewel of the Iranian Revolution in 
the Middle East, as most of the assistance to Hezbollah emanates from Iran through 
Syrian territory. Therefore, it is essential for Iran to do whatever possible to rescue 
both its Arab ally and Hezbollah in Lebanon. From a geopolitical standpoint, 
Hezbollah, though considered weak, is an essential element for Tehran in its anti-
Israeli rhetoric. With no doubt, the fall of the Assad regime would give rise to the 
emergence of a Sunni, pro-Saudi government that would be in every sense hostile 
toward Tehran. Therefore, with a Sunni government after the fall of Assad, there 
would be no guarantee whether it would allow Iran to replenish Hezbollah or not. 
Alongside other motivations, Tehran also observes the crisis in Syria from 
an ideological point of view. After the regime change in 1979, for the new Islamic 
regime of Iran, anti-Zionism, and Anti-imperialism became the new prism of its 
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foreign policy and therefore it is believed to be the root cause of the Iranian support 
for the Syrian regime.144 
Moreover, religious ideology may also be pointed out as a unifying factor 
between these two countries. Religion plays a vital role in the domestic affairs of 
Iran, while religious motives lack a place in Tehran’s foreign policy. However, such 
a case does not apply for the Syrian crisis, religious motives in Iran’s Syria policy 
are perhaps an exception because historically it can be said that a considerable 
discrepancy exists between the revolutionary principles and Iranian foreign policy 
practice, which causes many observers to question what drives the Islamic 
Republic’s foreign policy. Is it driven primarily by ideological or national interests? 
According to some, a clear case can be made for both. When on the one hand, the 
need for justice, Islamic solidarity and independence are all continuously 
mentioned in relation to the Palestinian situation, the equally legitimate Chechen 
struggle simply gets ignored for fear of antagonizing Russian interests. In another 
example of this, Muslim unity is mentioned as the driving motive to support Hamas 
and Hezbollah, but Iran also took the side of Christian Armenia in its war against 
their fellow Shia Azerbaijan to try to block the current of separatist Azerbaijani 
nationalism in Iran.145 
Sharing both a Shiite Islamic religious perspective and ethnic and cultural 
ties could be not the only effect on Iranian strategic policy. The pragmatism of 
Iranian foreign policy can be seen again in Iran’s response to the protests in Hama 
in 1982. The events that transpired in Hama, Syria in 1982, caused a real test for 
Iran’s pan-Islamic outlook. The Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood took 
control of Hama in March 1982, which prompted the Syrian regime to carry out a 
massacre, resulting in the deaths of over 10,000 people. Even though the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood had a clearly stated Islamist agenda and known Islamic 
credentials, Iran was silent about this atrocious massacre by the Syrian regime, for 
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the sake of not risking its own national interests. It is claimed by many political 
analysts that Iran kept its silence in exchange for the Syrian assistance against 
Iraq.146 
Meanwhile, Syria is home to almost 50 shrines that are important for Shiism 
and are located mostly in Damascus close to the Umayyad Mosque. The shrines of 
Sayyidnah Zaynab and Ruqayya and the Golden domed mosque are thought to be 
the holiest places of Shiite Islam after those located in Saudi and Iraq. From the 
very outset of the Syrian unrest, the protection of these Shiite sites particularly the 
shrines of Sayyida Ruqayya [daughter of Imam Hussein] and Sayyidnah Zaynab 
[daughter of Imam Ali] became a narrative of the Iranian policy toward Syria. Both 
shrines are believed to have been used as a foothold for the spread of Shiite religious 
influence. The Shiite sites are important for Iran in its export of the revolutionary 
ideology to the Shia community of Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq.147 In addition, after 
the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Iranian regime used Shiite sites as a focal point 
for organizing the Shiite militias to target the US presence in Iraq. Hence, one can 
conclude that the defense of the Shiite sites is fundamental to the narrative of the 
Iranian approach towards Syria. These sites have helped Iran to reinforce its 
influence over Shiites of the region and meanwhile, it has also played an essential 
role in absorbing Shiite fighters into its proxy war in Syria and Iraq.148 
Therefore, it is believed that Iran has promulgated its religious ideology 
with the defense of Shiite holy sites and placing importance on Mahdism. As a key 
strategy to generate popular support from the masses and for its aim to come out on 
top in both domestic and regional politics. As in Iraq, so too in Syria, the religious 
language has an apocalyptic feel, asserting the belief in the reappearance of their 
hidden Imam who is said to emerge at the end of time to establish justice on earth. 
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In Shiite theology, there is a kind of holy dynasty of twelve infallible Imams that 
they claim was initiated by the great Imam Ali, the cousin, and son in law of the 
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), with the twelfth in the chain being Imam Mahdi.149 
For the rise of the IRGC and its gaining foothold in Syrian territory, it has 
been necessary to enmesh the political and military program in the world view of 
Messianic Shiism. Fighting alongside the Assad regime, Iranian hardliners have 
installed the IRGC as the main military force in Syria. The IRGC and hardliners 
believe that their job is to clear the ground for the coming of their Imam and fight 
to spread their belief across the whole of the Middle East region or die trying. 
Indeed, their funerals take on the atmosphere of an intense religious ceremony as 
the dead are hailed to be noble martyrs for the cause and the flames of zealous 
passion are freshly stoked.150 
With the Quds Brigades head Qasim Suleimani proclaimed as the soldier of 
the Mahdi, Supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei, and his obedient people, plus the 
Revolutionary Guard in Syria, Iran officially consecrated these efforts as fighting 
terrorism by viewing them all through the religious narrative. Moreover, for its 
military endeavors, Iran has recruited Shiite volunteers from Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
and Lebanon and in neighboring Iraq.151 
In keeping with the revolutionary sense of comradeship, the hardliners camp 
makes full use of the sense of religious duty, bombarding its citizens from IRGC 
TV stations with images of the glorious martyrs who were willing to give all for the 
cause. Seeing itself as on the front line in the fight against Sunni extremism, such 
as the so-called Islamic state, the hardline camp is able to recruit Shiite participants 
from far and wide. Revealing the centrality of Mahdism, as it was, the glasses 
through which they see everything, the head of the IRGC Mohammad Ali 
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Jafari declared that , “The formation of Daesh and Takfiri groups and the events 
that occurred in the past years are paving the ground for the emergence of Imam 
Mahdi, and you can now see the positive results in the readiness of nearly 200,000-
armed youth in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen.”152 Jafari mentioned 
that Iran train troops inside and outside of Iran to be a worldwide united force. 
Therefore, hardliners took advantage of people’s religious sentiment, 
which, as a result, not only changed the political configuration at home but at the 
regional level. At home, they succeeded in defusing people reactions against the 
Iranian intervention in Syria while at the regional level, mainly in Syria, the Iranian 
regime successfully gathered thousands of Shiite fighters in support for the Assad 
struggle. 
As a result, while looking at all the determinants of the Iranian policy toward 
Syria, one can reach the point that Syria has a strategic value for Tehran, with its 
close border with Lebanon, Iraq, and Israel. Moreover, for Iran to channel its 
assistance to Hezbollah and other mercenaries across the region, it is essential to 
keep Bashar al Assad in power. If Assad falls, Iran would lose a lot of interests in 
the region, the falling of Assad would be a nightmare for the Iranian regime. A new 
government in Damascus would almost certainly be Sunni and rather unfriendly to 
Iran, and Iran’s regional interests would be severely damaged, and it would not only 
lose its only Arab ally in the heart of the Middle East, but also its access to its 
strategic interests across the region. Therefore, Iran has rigorously insisted on the 
importance of Syria, and as an ex-Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Velati in his 
speech claimed that: “Syria is the Golden ring of the axis of resistance, and it is our 
duty to support it and avoid losing it to the Zionists.”153 
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Meanwhile, many Iranian officials have made similar statements. One of 
the top Iranian Shia clerics and confidant of the supreme leader referred to Syria as 
the 35th province of Iran. To directly quote him, he was cited in the following way: 
“Syria is the 35th province of Iran, and If they attack us and want to take Syria or 
Khuzestan, the priority is to keep Syria because if we keep Syria we can also keep 
Khuzestan, but if we lose Syria, we will not even be able to hold Tehran.”154 
4.1. Debates in Iran over the War in Syria: Hardliners vs. Reformists 
Decision making on Syria has been affected by the considerably polarized 
camps of the reformists on the one hand and the hardliners on the other. The latter 
looking on the matter through their heavily religious apocalyptic glasses, with an 
end game narrative of good (Iran) against evil (USA/Israel), so threats to Iran’s 
security and their activities in Syria are perceived as coming from the US and its 
allies and proxies.  
It should be mentioned that the IRGC has been set up and mandated to 
protect the purity of the Iranian revolution’s religious ideology, as stated in the 
constitution. Then with the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the hardliners in Iran 
took the opportunity to spin their narrative in order to gain domestic support, 
accusing America of imposing on other countries its own values in order to control 
them and triggering revolutions in some cases, while in other cases like Iraq direct 
military invasion. So naturally, the hardliners considered their own opposite at 
home from the reformists as an extension of US operations and therefore sought to 
use all the means available to silence and nullify their efforts. During the first phase 
of the Syrian crisis that coincided with the presidential term of President 
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Ahmadinejad, reformist’s camp was severely constricted, and since then it has only 
got harder for reformists in Iran to operate.155 
The reformists in stark contrast to their hardliner opponents suggest that in 
order to strengthen the Islamic Republic, more cooperation with the West is 
necessary. Many reformists have experience living in Western nations while getting 
their education and see a need to generate economic investment there. The core 
beliefs of the reformists can be found in Mohammad Khatami’s dialogue of 
civilizations and Hassan Rouhani’s promotion of the method of engagement as 
these slogans highlight the belief that the maintaining of Iran’s founding ideology 
has to be in unison with all the paraphernalia of the modern nation-state. Therefore, 
in the case of Syria, there are as well various discernible areas on which the 
hardliners and reformists criticize each other’s as in the following way.156   
The first debate between hardliners and reformists focuses on political 
aspects of the Iranian involvement in Syria, whereas hardliners claim that Iranian 
involvement is inevitable for the strategic means, reformists argue that Iran’s 
involvement is irrelevant and unnecessary. The hardliners say the Islamic Republic 
of Iran has an important strategic objective in Syria and must have a strong presence 
in the country to play a leading role, whereas the reformers see Iranian involvement 
in Syria as unnecessary and voice serious reservations about being allied with the 
Assad Regime. Assad’s massacring of protestors at the start of the Syrian civil war 
was something actually supported and encouraged by the hardliners of Iran.  
The rationale of hardliners for Iran’s presence in Syria was both a perceived 
vulnerability should the regime fall and the need for a united Shia force in the face 
of Saudi funded “Salafi” Jihadi groups. The reformists see such groups as strategic 
pawns being used for merely political ends, but the hardliners see the matter through 
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the religiously tinted windows and therefore see themselves as the pure and true 
Shias fighting the corrupted and deviant terrorists. The reformists claim that the 
most effective and sensible way to combat the extremist jihadi groups is not by 
stirring up religious sentiment but by clever and strategic diplomacy. Reformists 
attempted to forward this mentality and give Iran a place at the table for the January 
2014 Geneva II Syria peace talks.  
The second area of the debates where real factions differ in Iran is regarding 
the threat and emergence of Daesh in 2014. While the reformists of Iran did not 
consider Daesh to be an influence within their nation, the hardliners proclaimed that 
the Islamic State group in Syria and its increasing power was a threat to national 
security that Iran had to actively combat in neighboring Syrian territory. The Iranian 
Supreme Leader declared in many Friday sermons the need for Iran to counter the 
threat saying, “If these martyrs did not stop the enemy…we would have to fight the 
ISIS in Kermanshah and Hamedan and other provinces.”157 He was referring to 
Iranians killed on Syrian soil and pointing a need for Iranian intervention in Syria. 
IRGC Quds Forces commander General Qasim Suleimani has spoken on several 
occasions along the same lines, reflecting the hardliner's concern about mainly 
Sunni Baluchi and Kurdish border regions and their potential for an alliance with 
Jihadi groups.  
However, in stark contrast, these fears were not initially shared by 
reformists as they asserted that the influence of these kind of groups like Daesh 
would not be able to penetrate Iran because of Iran’s deep sense of identity, distinct 
culture, and language. Reformist politician Mustafa Kawkabiyan was foremost in 
championing this view in 2014, but after the Islamic State (IS) declared a 
‘’caliphate’’ in Iraq on June 2014, the reformist camp also began to see the group 
as a threat to Iran’s security.158 Reformists and hardliners alike then view these 
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developments as a serious threat as was the case with Saddam Hussein before, now 
they saw that anti-Shia sentiment was brewing in a dangerous form and in their 
regional bordering countries.  
Therefore, the term, “Iranian Islam” from the mouth of the previous 
President Ahmadinejad was widely revoked across the country after ISIS launched 
a large-scale attack towards Baghdad and Damascus reaching almost few 
kilometers to the Iraqi capital. The incident had a seismic impact across Iran with 
hardliners able to use it to ignite both Shia and nationalist emotions to drum up 
public support in Syria against their Sunni terrorist enemies8. These attack which 
the Iranian government said were carried out by ‘’Takfiri separatist groups 
supported by the reactionary Arab countries seemed to add fuel to an already raging 
fire of Iranian religious and nationalist feeling.159 
It can be seen that while the military operations of the Iranians in Syria have 
a unifying effect at home, this may well be focused on to deliberately shift attention 
away from Iran’s propping up of the controversial Assad Regime. Iran’s hardliners 
support their involvement in Syria as a religious duty to protect the holy Shia 
shrines there. By 2015 the number of Iranian dead in Syria surpassed one thousand, 
but interestingly the regime was trying to prevent the public from 40th-day ritual 
mourning services which have served previous years as a way of the regime’s 
wartime mobilizing efforts. And moreover, the conflict was barely given air-time 
in the media as way to try to not get the masses too mournful about it, but then with 
the IS terror attacks in 2017-18 and the effect they had on the country the regime 
began to step up its hardliner religiously driven narrative to stoke up the nation 
against its enemies. Officials in the government also put forward that these attacks 
were at the same time part of a Western conspiracy to destabilize Iran.160  
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Moreover, the domestic debate over Syria increased in late 2015 alongside 
the increase in Iranian military officers being killed there, and the debate turned to 
focus on the country intensifying its support for President Bashar al-Assad. Huge 
murals glorifying the nations dead in the capital Tehran showed the painful price of 
war. Although Iranian loses in Syria are not comparable in the scale of loss to the 
80s Iraq-Iran war, which cost hundreds of thousands of Iranian lives but many 
worries about where this one is heading. Both 2015 and 2016 were years that saw 
an increase in mourning as the Iranian Republic saw the loss of one of its top 
generals Hossein Hamedani, two colonels and nine other members of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).161 
Therefore, the deaths of two high ranking commanders in Syria sparked 
open criticism from the reformist side, by arguing that “why Iranian commanders 
should be lost this much easily.” This is a mistake that should not have been 
repeated again as it was made during Iraq-Iran war,” drawing similarities to the 
situation in Iraq in the 80s when Iran also lost leading figures from the military.162 
Therefore, in response to some of the deaths of IRGC fighters, the reformist’s camp 
argued that military intervention in Syria was such as grave mistake that cost Iran 
losing its top military generals in the Syrian soil. While on the other hand the 
hardliners see Iran’s military actions in Syria as important to combat the threats, 
whereas the reformists make the point that was Iran to keep losing leading generals 
in Syria and Daesh to come to Iran’s borders, they would no longer have their most 
competent military leading to defend the nation. 
In addition, the last debate or yet another area of disagreement between the 
hardliners and the reformists on Iran’s Syria policy is over the financial fallouts of 
the crisis and its impacts on the Iranian economy. The financial fallouts of the 
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Iranian have singled further area of complaint for reformists to voice their anger 
about the economic cost of Iran’s foreign policies. Reformist’s camp accuses their 
hardliners counterparts of spending billions of dollars abroad that must have been 
spent instead at home, in support of the Syrian president Bashar al Assad. The 
reformist official also blamed the protests of 2017-18, to be motivated by the 
regimes spending in Syria, as it can be clearly seen from slogans of people shouting 
such as “My life for Iran, not for Gaza or Lebanon,” against economic cost of Iran’s 
foreign policies. 
Prominent reformists political sciences professor Sadiq Ziba Kalam at the 
University of Tehran in 2017, referred to the slogans chanted at the protests of 
December 2017, neither Gaza nor Lebanon, said that “Iran comes first to me than 
the other countries, he was also quoted as Palestine is the first priority of 
Palestinians, the same for Lebanese Lebanon comes first. Therefore the slogan 
neither Gaza nor Lebanon, my soul is for Iran is right and for me comes Iran and 
Iran’s interests first. According to him, these slogans are perfectly correct, and it 
means that when inside home people are hungry, we do not have to give priority to 
any other countries. Therefore, the national capital of the country must primarily be 
spent at home rather than being spent abroad.163 
The same criticism was addressed in June 2018 by the member of 
parliament, Behrouz Bonyadi, after boldly condemning the justification for the 
violent crackdown on the protests of the government by claiming they were 
triggered by the US, he went on to explain how Iran’s policies in the region had 
come at the cost of “60 billion US dollars.”164 
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However, on the other hand, the hardliners camp emphasizes that supporting 
the Syrian regime is the moral and religious duty of Iran to use all its options 
available at hand in order to save their national interests abroad. As Ayatollah 
Khamenei was quoted many times during his Friday sermons that the Iranian 
regime will keep Bashar al Assad at any cost. While at the same view another 
hardline politician, Ali Fallahian, a member of Iran’s Assembly of Experts and a 
former intelligence minister, was quoted as it is the religious and moral duty of Iran 
to save up Bashar al Assad financially even if these aids cost Iran financial fallouts 
at home as he was quoted “we have to eat just once a day or fast.”165 
Taking into consideration, the remarks made by both camps give a clear 
vision of cracks between the hardliners and reformists as it could be clearly seen 
the reformists, on one hand, have showed their discontent with the regime policy in 
Syria while on the other hand, the hardliners camp have defended regime policy 
and IRGC intervention in Syria. Therefore, the majority of political pundits believe 
that the Syrian crisis marked a change of configuration in Iran politics. Iranian 
reformist, although winning two consecutive terms were cut off from having any 
access to political power by their hardliner’s counterparts. However, questions arise 
here, such as: How the Syrian crisis played an important role in the power 
configuration of Iran? And how Iranian hardliners succeeded to claw back the 
power they had lost to the reformist’s camp? 
Therefore, to answer these questions, the matter can be revisited throughout 
the different phases of the Syrian crisis, which witnessed substantial political 
reshuffling in Iran.  
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4.2. Empowerment of the Hardliners during the Presidency of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad  
When the trouble first started in Syria, it was during the latter term of the 
presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in whose time the hardliners grew to 
dominate. Not expecting the so-called Arab spring to spread to Syria, the 
leadership in Tehran could be seen in vocal support for the uprisings in Egypt, 
Libya, and Tunisia. Iran took the usual stance, seeing it as a people’s revolt, 
standing up to the regimes that were agents and allies of the West, but when the 
peoples opposition flared up in Syria the hardliners could not support it in the 
same way as in North Africa because they didn’t want to oppose their important 
ally in the region. Iran, therefore, rejected the credibility of those rising up against 
the Assad regime by accusing them of being pawns of foreign powers. 
Although military activities of Iran in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and the across 
the Middle East had massive cost both economically and in terms of the loss of 
lives but in spite of this, the Iranian government adopted a zero-tolerance policy 
on any sign of criticism of its involvement abroad. Not just active political 
reformists but ordinary citizens were also threatened or arrested. At the time of 
Ahmadinejad, the issue of Syria was a kind of forbidden topic, and the hardliners 
just used it to expand the domestic influence on policymaking. 
Therefore, the initial phase of the Syrian crisis meant that the hardliners 
could become more dominant inside Iran and in the meantime, they strongly 
recommended Bashar al-Assad to respond in full force to the revolt to put an end 
to it. The hardliners, who put down nonviolent Green Movement of 2009-10 
through a fierce crackdown, not surprisingly suggested the Syrian regime to not 
to tolerate rebels and employ harshest measures. However, on the other hand, 
most of the reformists were in favor of the Green Movement and were calling for 
caution in Iran’s support for Syria.166 
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During this period of the crisis, the hardliners who insisted about the need 
for Assad to stay in power and the need for Iran to support him gave Syrian regime 
billions of dollars in aid. Alongside financial aid was considerable support of man 
on the ground from military advisors, Lebanese Hezbollah soldiers to non-Iranian 
Shiite militants who were recruited and trained by the IRGC. The hardliners 
claimed that without taking the battle to Syria, the battle would come to their 
homelands in Khuzestan.Very revealing words were declared in February 2013 
by Hojjat al-Islam Mehdi Taeb, head of Ayatollah Khamenei’s think-tank Ammar 
Strategic Center, at a meeting with university student members of the Basij 
paramilitary force was quoted as: “Syria is the 35th province of Iran and is a 
strategic province for us. If the enemy attacks us and wants to appropriate either 
Syria or Khuzestan [an Arab-populated Iranian province bordering Iraq’s Basra], 
the priority is that we keep Syria. If we keep Syria, we can keep Khuzestan too. 
But if we lose Syria, we cannot keep Tehran.”167 
In contrast, the reformists, linking the fate of Iran with Assad has caused 
some clearly expressed opposition from within the reformist camp, in spite of the 
risk of house arrest for their perceived dissidence. They agree that it is important 
not to see Syria falling into the hands of enemy Sunni groups funded by Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey, and the Gulf countries, but disagree that Assad should remain in 
the office. Other calls from reformists for moderation and a diplomatic approach 
to Syria came from the former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. It was 
interesting to see when he delivered a speech, in which he sympathized with the 
innocents Syrians, as being victims of the chemical attacks and the weapons used 
by the regime. However, the Iranian Labor News Agency (ILNA or in Persian 
Khbar Guzari Kari Iran) falsified his words to the effect that Syrian government 
could not be explicitly be blamed. Rafsanjani’s Speech was an indicator of the 
reformist’s liberal stance that seeking a diplomatic solution is a must. Threats 
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from the hardliners in both direct and indirect ways quickly put a stop to the 
opposition from the reformist’s camp, and once again the conservative hardliners 
of Iran had it their way.168 
Furthermore, even before the uprising and the subsequent crisis in Syria, 
the Iranian hardliners from the IRGC had already firmly been established in a very 
dominant position during this phase of the Syrian crisis. The IRGC since having 
played a key part during the Iran-Iraq War in the eighty’s, had been able to exert 
significant influence over Iranian politics. It could be observed in the 
Ahmadinejad era that the IRGC took a continually assertive stance, that being the 
first time they declared their own foreign policy agenda. At that time, they had 
also increased their involvement in the economy, with unprecedented government 
energy and construction contracts worth billions. Indeed, with nearly all of the 
Ahmadinejad cabinet being from amongst the IRGC or at least strongly allied with 
them, the scene was set for the emerging power.169 
However, as the war broke out in the neighboring Syria, the IRGC was 
able to exploit the situation and gain even more strength and license to carry out 
Iranian policy. They have been able to bypass conventional methods in Syria by 
uniting other militant groups driven by Shi’a religious ideology like Hezbollah. 
Iran has ensured access to Syria for Shi’a fighters from Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Asaib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH- The league of Righteous), Hezbollah Brigades, and 
Kataib Sayyid al- Shuhada (The Masters of the Martyrs Brigade), are all Shi’a 
militant groups who are active in Syria and who have orders and funding 
assistance directly from the IRGC. Moreover, these groups justify their presence 
in Syria by expressing the need to protect this holy site as one of the pilgrimage 
sites for Shi'as is the Sayyidah Zainab Shrine in the outskirts of Damascus to the 
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south and at the same time, they fight in support of the Assad regime in rural areas 
outside of Damascus. It was reported that Iran managed to assemble a 
considerable force of Syrians from the Shi’a and Alawite sects by the name (Jaysh 
al-Sha’bi or People Army).170For the IRGC to achieve this, they must have had 
affirmation from Supreme Leader Khamenei. Therefore, it was not surprising that 
both Khamenei and Ahmadinejad provided unequivocal support for the IRGC for 
their intervention in Syria.  
All in all, the scale of the Iranian and Syrian cooperation during this phase 
coinciding with the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of the Syrian crisis 
were at peak. Despite initial criticism from the reformist’s camp, Ahmadinejad and 
Ayatollah Khamenei favored Military Corporation with the Syrian regime; both 
men consistently promised Assad their full support Iranian regime at the hand of 
hardliners continued to stand side by side with Assad in his fight to hold the rebels 
at bay. 
4.3. Questioning the Official Policy during the Presidency of Hassan Rouhani  
The course of the events in Syria took another turn when the reformists in 
IR won the election in May 2013. This phase of the crisis was also characterized by 
the rise of ISIS, which spread its presence in Syria. ISIS shifted the dynamics of the 
crisis making the US and the European countries change their priorities. Where in 
the first phase, the US policies aimed at changing the regime, in the second phase, 
the US reprioritized its policies and focused on eliminating ISIS instead of regime 
change in Syria. Accordingly, debates of this phase were informed by the 
necessities of changing strategies presented by all parties involved in Syria. 
By the time Rouhani came on the scene in August 2013 the war in Syria had 
been going on for two years and at the start, he was expected to get engaged in a 
more diplomatic way of moving forward. However, before we go into the details of 
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Rouhani’s policies and of the way in which he dealt with the Syrian crisis, a couple 
of points related to the power configuration in Iran need to be emphasized. The first 
point was that despite Rouhani secured clear-cut electoral support, he was not able 
to get the full control of the security policymaking process.  Another point that 
needs to be underscored is that the hardliners never let Rouhani get fully engaged 
with the situation of forces on the ground in Syria. As a result of this power 
configuration, Rouhani’s involvement, in particularly at the beginning of his first 
term, was anything but decisive. Therefore, before Rouhani had actually made any 
official statement on Syria, there was a lot of speculation in Iranian media 
reportedly leaked from the Presidents inner circle, claimed that the new government 
was to pursue a more soft policy towards Syria.171 
However, the policy of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in Syria came in 
the context of harsh US economic sanctions and international ostracization. The 
newly established government in Tehran approached the Syrian situation from 
having been subjected to strong criticism, and Rouhani attempted to mend broken 
relations with the international community on the nuclear issue in order to ease 
sanctions. At first, there was a much softer policy on Syria as a way for Tehran to 
enhance its negotiating power in nuclear talks, but Iran knew all too well the 
geopolitical importance of their border sharing ally that they were not keen on 
loosing.  
Efforts to assert Iran’s interests in the region were underway right from the 
start of Rouhani coming to office, and he clearly reflected an approach in harmony 
with the international community. An example of this could be seen in a press 
conference back in August 2013, when President Rouhani declared that “The 
solution to the Syrian crisis is a negotiation between all Syrian groups on one side 
and the Damascus government on the other, small terrorists coming to Syria from 
abroad should be expelled”, and he “strongly condemned the idea of foreign-backed 
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terrorists in Syria, reiterating that “bloodshed in the Arab country must immediately 
come to a halt.”172 
This was a considerable shift in rhetoric in relation to the Syrian opposition 
that must not be underestimated because an Iranian President had never before 
suggested that there were any justified causes with Syrian rebel groups because the 
view of the previous IRGC/Ahmadinejad administration was that the Syrian crisis 
came from outside forces conspiring and that all the rebel groups posing threats to 
the Syrian government were to be simply dismissed as terrorists.  
Meanwhile, Rouhani held the view that the opposition rebel groups in Syria 
had to have a place at the negotiating table in discussions on Syria’s future, and 
therefore he gave some legitimacy to the opposition, and he also insisted on the idea 
that the international community had a leading part to play in peace talks. 
Meanwhile, the hardliners of the IRGC and their agenda in Syria was running on a 
completely different course, and the policy of Rouhani was a real obstacle for them. 
For the anti-Assad forces to be given a role in Syria’s future and for Assad to be 
removed would fly in the face of the IRGC and their plans for dominance in the 
Levant most specifically in Syria and Lebanon.  
Moreover, Soon after being elected in June 2013, Rouhani had also caused 
a friction with the hardliners when he pointed out some inconsistencies and double 
standards in the Iranian policy which on the one hand rejected the harsh crackdown 
of the Bahraini government against Shiite protesters, while at the same time failed 
to condemn the Syrian regime’s brutality in dealing with its people’s uprising. As 
he clearly stated that, "We should not describe as oppressive brutal actions in an 
enemy country while refraining from calling the same actions oppressive if they 
take place in a friendly country.”  He said, "Brutality must be called brutality."173 
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However, Rouhani’s strong reaction against the Syrian regime came right 
after the Syrian regime use of chemical weapons, killing nearly 1,000 people in 
Ghouta and Damascus. Thereafter, Hassan Rouhani strongly condemned the 
incident, and he called for an international ban on such weapons.174Without 
mentioning a name of who used them, he nonetheless tweeted, “Iran gives notice to 
the international community to use all its might to prevent the use of chemical 
weapons anywhere in the world, esp. in #Syria.”175  
Hence, by not blaming the opposition, he left an open possibility that the 
Assad regime was guilty and therefore it is believed that he made a very significant 
statement which was at odds with both the hardliners and Moscow who blamed the 
rebels. Moreover, right after this incident, Rouhani was also was quoted to have 
said strong words to the army commanders of the IRGC such as “we oppose 
chemical weapons. Whatever group or individual in whatever place uses these 
weapons, we will condemn it, and it is unacceptable for us.”176   
Iranians had dark memories of being the target of chemical weapons in the 
hands of Saddam Hussain in the gruesome conflict between Iraq and Iran during 
eighties, therefore, to strengthen his statement, Rouhani reminded them of their past 
experiences at the hands of Saddam. All these statements given by Rouhani were 
significant because they gave rise to speculations that Rouhani supported the 
overthrow of Assad even though he avoided commenting on the issue directly. 
In addition, Hassan Rouhani also baffled many observers right after the 
cancelation of Iran’s involvement In January 2014 Geneva II peace talks. Hassan 
Rouhani was quoted that If Iran were given an opportunity, he would have fully 
supported a mandate as a way to try to bring about peace in Syria. Rouhani’s 
eagerness to collaborate with other countries on Syria took many by surprise. Six 
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months into the job, Rouhani had attempted to cooperate with the outside world on 
a solution for the terrible crisis in Syria to make Iranian foreign policy closer to the 
Western nations. This did not amount to a very dramatic change but a slightly 
different position from Tehran.177 As Iran was always loyal to the Syrian 
government and threatening military action in support of the Damascus regime, the 
arrival of Rouhani put that into question as he generated optimism of a more 
inclusive approach to the crisis by working with the international community 
together. 
However, Rouhani’s honeymoon indeed proved to be short-lived, and 
therefore certain factors are believed to be behind Hassan Rouhani’s failure of 
changing Iranian policy discourse towards Syria, yet three major factors such as the 
IRGC involvement in the Syrian crisis, the failure of Geneva II 2014 peace talks, 
and the rapid emergence of the ISIS, are believed to be the major factors that 
restricted the area for Hassan Rouhani in changing the Iranian policy discourse 
towards the Syria crisis and therefore to meticulously understand the matter each 
of the factor will be elaborated as in the following way.   
4.3.1. Challenges to President Hassan Rouhani’s Stance  
Firstly, and foremost among one of the major factors that restricted the area 
for President Hassan Rouhani in changing the Iranian policy discourse towards 
Syria, was the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC continued to 
prevent Rouhani from following an influential policy in Syria, where they have 
increasingly become engaged since the previous administration. According to Al-
monitor shortly before the President Rouhani’s appointment in July 2013, there was 
stated in an article on an ultra-conservative website Ya Lasarat Hussain (2013) 
linked to the IRGC “Hassan Rouhani cannot promote a ceasefire in Syria, nor it is 
within his jurisdiction to do so.”178  
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In the meantime, according to Akbarzadeh (2016), a media connected to the 
IRGC always promoted a brutal approach to Syria. After the deaths of three IRGC 
soldiers in the district near to the Sayiddah Zainab Shrine, Javan a pro-IRGC 
newspaper, reported the incident in August 2013 as that was at the start of 
Rouhani’s presidency, ignoring it two months before in June when it actually 
occurred. An influential Shi’a Iraqi figure who sits on the Supreme Islamic Council 
of Iraq warned of further rifts between the President and the IRGC and mentioned 
that Rouhani wants to see Assad resign from his post in Syria.179  
Therefore, President Rouhani from the very first was cautious of the IRGC 
role in engaging into the internal politics. Therefore, in his numerous speeches, he 
warned IRGC’s role and its engagement in the politics both directly and indirectly. 
Rouhani in September 2013 in an annual meeting directly told the IRGC 
commanders that “the IRGC should understand the politics very well but should 
not intervene in it because it belongs to the whole Iranian nation,”180  
Meanwhile, he also indirectly pointed to the role of IRGC to stay out of 
politics by saying that the IRGC should take an example of the Iranian military for 
being natural in the political matters.181 President Rouhani has put emphasis on the 
conventional foreign ministry overseeing and commanding foreign policy as has 
been reported in foreign affairs by foreign minister Zarif, who said the ministry 
should function “as the central organ for planning and executing Iran’s foreign 
policy.” This might, in fact, not be possible because of the IRGC’s influence of 
policy in the area they are specifically focused on.182 
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In addition, another factor that also contributed to the restriction of President 
Hassan Rouhani’s role over Iran Syria policy was the Geneva II Talks, it is believed 
that the balance of power further tilted towards Hardliners when Iran’s participation 
was canceled at the Geneva II conference in 2014. Rouhani had invested a lot in the 
Geneva II Talks, and they were crucial to give clout to his Syrian policy, but the 
UN Secretary-General canceled Iran’s invitation in the last minute causing severe 
embarrassment for the reformist president. This also offered the IRGC and the 
president’s hardliner critics an opportunity to challenge President Rouhani’s policy 
toward Syria. Several notable sources claimed that Iran being canceled from the 
Geneva II talks was the work of US pressure.183 
It is suggested that the United States refused to support Iranian participation 
in the peace talks unless they accepted the conditions set in 2012, which state that 
the collective aim of the talks was to see a transitional government in Syria, founded 
on the basis of consent from all opposing parties including the Assad government 
and its political opponents. Meanwhile, some Iranian officials were also stating US 
responsibility for the cancelation of Iranian involvement.  In an interview with the 
Washington post, Allaedin Boroujerdi the head of the National Security and 
Foreign Policy Commission of Iran’s parliament said “The U.S. put pressure on 
[U.N. Secretary General] Ban Ki-moon, and he was forced to cancel this invitation, 
which shows this international body is still under the influence of big powers, 
headed by the U.S.”184 Likewise, Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif also made 
similar remarks saying that depriving Iran of the Geneva peace talks is the work of 
the Syrian opposition and the US who put pressure on the general secretary of UN 
to cancel Iran participation in the meeting about the Syrian crisis.185 
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As a result, Shahram Akbarzade(2016) states that Rouhani needed to save 
his face after the humiliation caused by the Geneva II conference. Therefore, a 
distinct change of tone did not go unnoticed in his statements as he endeavored to 
discredit the Geneva peace talks to respond to the rejection. He stated terrorism as 
the main problem in Syria, and he fell in line with Iranian hardliners and the Russian 
and official Syrian Regime view. And in the meantime, the post-Geneva II 
problems at home for Rouhani were clearly mounting up with critics from the 
hardliners and the pro-IRGC-media suggesting that Rouhani has made Iran more 
exposed and vulnerable to threats from the United States.186 
Therefore, Geneva II is believed to be one of the most significant in the 
development of Iran’s policy on Syria because it caused an almost immediate revers 
to the unconditional support for the Syrian regime.  After the Geneva incident in 
January 2014, the IRGC could begin to regain influence, exploiting the 
international fallout to bolster their agenda and position over Iran policy on Syria. 
Accordingly, Iran’s military support in Syria also increased with hundreds of 
military officials from the Quds force assisting the Syrian regime’s gathering of 
intelligence and also providing military training for Syrian soldiers. All the rhetoric 
from Iran about its need to support the Assad government was in terms of fighting 
terrorism. Then when the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) arrived on 
the scene and made considerable progress in 2014, it just gave more momentum 
and justification to the hardliners camp strategy of protecting Assad from the fanatic 
and extremist terrorists. 
Moreover, the meteoric rise of the ISIS brought about sea changes and 
shaped the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East. The IS reshaped regional 
dynamics, which had an enormous impact on the power struggle between the 
hardliners and reformists led by the president Hassan Rouhani. Along with the rise 
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of ISIS came a new chapter in the Syrian crisis and Iran’s approach to it. ISIS had 
a big impact on both the balance powers on the ground and caused remarkable shifts 
in regional and Western perspectives. The terrorist attacks in the European cities 
made ISIS regional threat and enemy its fight in the Syrian conflict reached beyond 
the Middle East, forcing the West to also take notice of the ISIS threats. When ISIS 
took over the important Iraqi city of Mosul, reformists, as well as hardliners, saw 
the situation as a very serious danger to Iran. The fall of Mosul meant the threat of 
anti-Shia ISIS was brewing and getting closer to home.   
The rise of ISIS indubitably, and particularly in Iraq, was something that 
Tehran could not predict and as soon as the group gained ground in Iraq, Iran had 
to respond with a new policy. Firstly, the Iranian approach was to try to shrink the 
threat, but as ISIS gained more success, the approach of Iran changed to become 
involved ‘from behind.’ Then, as the terror group’s militants drew ever nearer to its 
territory, Iran decided to increase its involvement in Iraq in an attempt to halt further 
potential spilling over of the group’s violent activities into other parts Iraq and 
Syria.187 
Meanwhile, the rise ISIS played an important role in unifying the two camps 
against the threats of the militant group. As suggested by some hardliners factions 
that the rise of ISIS was a “God Gift” that put both the reformists and hardliners on 
the same track, both camps viewed ISIS as a growing threat to Iran.188 The 
reformists had believed Iran to be protected from foreign ideology due to the 
strength of its own distinctive identity and culture but changed their tune after 
seeing the speed at which ISIS brutally imposed itself on Mosul and other regions 
of Iraq and Syria.  
Therefore, the swift advance of ISIS and the fear from Tehran of a spillover 
into Iranian lands, caused the Iranian government to step up its engagement. Iran, 
as mentioned, adopted the approach of keeping minimum boots on the ground and 
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making their activities as indiscernible in some or other ways possible. Iran 
provided logistical and military support and advice to any group that it deemed as 
a counterforce to ISIS, while not hesitating to get directly involved when needed, 
as long as that did not jeopardize their general strategy. Iran’s taking on the “leading 
from behind” strategy, seemed to benefit the regime in Tehran in its strategy for 
saving its ally in Syria. Iran taking ISIS threat as pretext increased its support 
politically, militarily and financially to the Syrian regime and it also would deploy 
its elite force for direct engagement, whenever necessary. While stretching Iranian 
resources, this commitment did, however, produce the desired result of Assad’s 
going virtually unchallenged and ironically, seems to have been by the ISIS 
phenomenon.189 
So, it can be understood that with the arrival of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, 
Iranian foreign policies both at home and abroad, were massively affected. Within 
the domestic arena, this phenomenon further sidelined Rouhani’s agenda in regard 
to his policy on Syria. With the claim in June 2014 of establishing a caliphate 
stretching from Iraq through to Syria, the IRGC and hardliners drew even more 
strength in justifying their tough militant approach in Syria. Moreover, in abroad 
the outlandish declaration of a caliphate in Iraq and Syria by ISIS, made IRGC more 
dominant and meanwhile it also enabled the Quds Force officers to mobilize 
thousands of foreign Shia fighters, including Afghans, Iraqis, and Pakistanis in 
order to strengthen the army manpower of the Syrian regime’s forces. IRGC-Quds 
force commander, General Suleimani became a prominent figure for the hardliners 
as he led the frontlines against the threat of ISIS and other extremist Sunni groups 
in Syria and Iraq. On several occasions, General Suleimani could be seen 
photographed in the battlefield. All this gave a clear message to President Rouhani 
showing the strength and dominance of the IRGC and its activities in the region are 
not to be questioned or challenged which inevitably resulted in further ostracizing 
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Rouhani and his capacity to implement his policy toward Syria both at home and 
abroad.190 
As a result of these three factors, Rouhani became severely restricted, and 
whole situation forced him to adopt the foreign policy agenda of the hardline IRGC, 
leaving Iran totally fixed on supporting the Syrian regime as a holy duty to combat 
the Sunni terrorists and counter Israel’s efforts to stifle the “axis of resistance.” 
Foreign Minister Zarif made statements to this effect in 2014, after talks with Syrian 
Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem in Tehran, Zarif declared that Iran would 
remain to be in complete solidarity with the Syrian government. Zarif said the 
Syrian government and the Syrian people can count on his support because these 
“Takfiri” groups were their common enemies. Demonstrating this view Rouhani 
stated after a meeting with the Syrian Prime Minister “the Syrian government and 
nation have been able to resist well against plots and the war and the international 
public opinion is aware of this fact that the Syrian nation and army are fighting 
against terrorist groups and foreign plots.”191  
Going one step further in June 2nd, 2015 Rouhani went on to promise that 
“The Iranian nation and government will remain at the side of the Syrian nation and 
government until the end of the road…Tehran has not forgotten its moral 
obligations to Syria and will continue to provide help and support on its own terms 
to the government and nation of Syria.” Iran’s politicians became unable to prevent 
the complete dominance of the IRGC by the middle of 2014 in relation to the 
foreign policy, and the rhetoric of the hardliners was once again holding sway.192 
Moreover, on the sidelines of the security conference in Munich on 
February 2014, Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif admitted then to 
the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, that he did not have control over Iran’s policy 
discourse on Syria. This admission leaves no doubt that instead of a conventional 
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government foreign affairs ministry leading policy on Syria, it is the Shi’a religious 
fervor of the Supreme Leader and hardliners taking the reins.193 
Although Rouhani was having a smoother time in his initial six months in 
the job and in that time, he tried to engage with the international community on the 
matter of a peaceful solution in Syria. Meanwhile, the conservative hardliners of 
the IRGC were looking for a way to regain their position of influence on the policy 
toward Syria. The rapid rise of ISIS and the setback in Geneva proved to be the 
catalysts for the IRGC ad Hardliners to retain their dominance over Syrian policy 
by increasing military support and this provided a pretext to increase its military 
engagement. 
All this shows that there are real limits in the power of a President in Iran. 
Rouhani clearly had a vision for Iran’s Syria policy, which may have been a 
workable one, but he has been rendered ineffective by conservative religious 
elements within the power structure of the country. The main factor in shaping the 
internal and regional politics of Iran has been due to the Hardliners and IRGC grip 
on power, which they have revived as a result of their engagement in Syria. 
Therefore, it was clear that the country’s domestic politics and policy on Syria were 
being steered neither by Rouhani and nor by his foreign minister Javad Zarif; 
instead, it has been steered by the hardliners camp. 
 4.4. Concluding Remarks  
There is no doubt, the Syrian crisis has served as a case of test of power 
balance between the hardliners and reformists factions in Iran. Therefore, it is 
believed that the Syrian crisis is one of the most decisive in the Iranian history since 
the advent of the Islamic Revolution. The crisis in Syria put both camps at the 
debate over various discernible areas on which they criticize each other’s. The 
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hardliners say the Islamic Republic of Iran has an important strategic objective in 
Syria and must have a strong presence in the country to play a leading role, whereas 
the reformers see Iranian involvement in Syria as unnecessary and voice serious 
reservations about being allied with the Assad Regime. Assad’s massacring of 
protestors at the start of the Syrian civil war was something actually supported and 
encouraged by the hardliners of Iran.  
However, the reformists have seen events go against them by giving the religious 
hardliners, especially from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a center stage. 
Although Rouhani was having a smoother time in his initial six months in the job 
and in that time, he tried to engage with the international community on the matter 
of a peaceful solution in Syria. However, unstable conditions in the region such as 
the rapid rise of ISIS and the setback in Geneva proved to be the catalysts for the 
IRGC ad Hardliners to retain their dominance militant approach over Iran’s Syria 
policy. 
All this shows that the Syrian crisis became a watershed movement, and it 
had a great impact on the internal power configuration of Iran. It completely 
changed the tide of power against the reformist’s camp although they had two 
consecutive electoral victories.  
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Conclusions 
         It can be said with confidence that Iran is not a rogue state and discussion 
as to what drives its foreign policy remains open. This thesis is an attempt to make 
plain the way Iranian foreign policy in Syria has been made with a pragmatic and 
defensive mindset. The first chapter shows how the mutually beneficial and 
strategic cooperation between Iran and Syria has from the very start been based on 
a clearly pragmatic purpose; seeking to consolidate and protect the power of both 
governments. What will be clarified, however, is that this alliance is not just a 
simple marriage of convenience. This thesis unveiled how the mutual aims and 
perspectives of both nations have not only strengthened their relationship and seen 
it survive up until today but have also meant that the horrific Syrian conflict war 
has become a scenario that has forced their alliance to become closer than ever 
before. To fully grasp how high the stakes are for Iran in Syria and the reason it has 
unwaveringly stood by the Assad government since all the chaos erupted in 2011, 
the thesis had more in more depth look at the historical roots of their alliance. With 
fundamentally shared beliefs on the most pressing issues of the region, the 
cementing of their alliance over the decades has not really come as a massive 
surprise.  
Historical studies in the thesis demonstrate a notable similarity between 
Iranian and Syrian foreign policy agenda and world view over the past thirty years. 
Both Iran and Syria can be observed to have the same skepticism of outside forces 
plotting against them and attempting to influence their affairs. A shared pragmatic 
understanding of their alliance was founded from 1979 to the present day. Security 
is the word that best summarizes the need for their alliance. Nevertheless, the 
demands of building a modern-day economy on the shaky ground of constant 
political changes in the region have caused Iran and Syria to adapt their policies 
accordingly. In times of conflicting interests, they have managed a harmonious 
collaboration strengthened by sharing of common enemies, allies, political and 
economic interests and also with much the same type of religious affiliations. 
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After the war in Syria in 2011 broke out, the relationship took on a new 
importance. With the initial wave of protests beginning in Tunisia, in the winter of 
2010-2011 and then rippling out into neighboring countries. The reaction from 
Tehran was supportive because Iran thought that the Arab nations freeing 
themselves of Western dominance. Iran celebrated the Arab spring and declared it 
as a genuine Islamic uprising in the Middle East and North Africa that would spell 
the end of Western-sponsored tyrants and path the way for popular Islamist 
governments. In other words, from Iran’s perspective, these uprisings meant that 
the tables had finally turned on their enemies.  
However, when it came to the uprising in Syria, the government in Tehran 
found itself in a dilemma because if it chose to support Syria, it would be seen as 
hypocritical and risk losing all respect of the Muslim world. But if it just stood by 
and watched Assad’s demise, there would be a real likelihood that whatever regime 
would emerge after Assad would not share Iran’s agenda and therefore Iran would 
lose an ally that it needs in order to protect its position in the region. When 
considering all these elements we find that Iran has two main perspectives on the 
recent Middle Eastern developments: in North Africa (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia), and 
the Gulf (Bahrain, and Yemen). Iran named these uprisings Islamic awakenings and 
connected them to their own, so called Islamic revolution. Iran saw all the unrest 
and protests in the North Africa and in the Gulf as the unfolding of an Islamic 
awakening that for a long time, had been needed. In the Levant, it can be said that 
Tehran has shown double standards and as mentioned before in relation to Bahrain, 
Iran accused the US of having double standards in its response to the uprising that 
broke out in Bahrain and Yemen.  
The Syrian crisis was a threat to the decades' long Syrian-Iranian alliance 
because the Assad government’s future was hanging in the balance and the end of 
Assad would be the end of Iran’s closest and most important regional ally. Actually, 
the fall of Assad would be the most serious challenge to Iran since 1988, when it 
had to exit the conflict with Iraq and in fact, the end of Assad it could become the 
challenge for the Islamic Republic of Iran since its inception. It would also cause 
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an obstacle for the ideologically driven foreign policy agenda that Iran is currently 
pursuing. The current Syrian rulers are the only reliable ally of Tehran from among 
the Arab counties, and the collaboration enables the flow of Iranian arms and 
material aid to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The ousting of the Assad regime in Damascus 
would change the balance of power in the region in a considerable way. Iran would 
be unable to provide support to Hezbollah which would then make Iran incapable 
of sufficient influence in Lebanon and in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The worst 
nightmare of Iran is their ally being replaced by an anti-Shia regime allied with 
Saudi Arabia. 
Therefore, in a bid to prevent this from happening the Iranian regime in the 
initial phase of the Syrian civil coinciding with the later part of the president 
Ahmadinejad era, sought to develop a position on the Syria which would best suite 
their ideological agenda. As the distressing scenes of unrest in Syria emerged, Iran 
put its eggs in the basket of the Alawite regime but at times has shown somewhat 
contradictory approaches on its involvement in Syria. At first, Iran made no 
response to the violent crackdown of the protesters by the Syrian authorities. As the 
situation went from bad to worse, it went outside the control of Bashar Assad, 
Tehran then begun to spout rhetoric about foreign intervention and accusing Israel 
and the US of deliberately provoking protests to cause unrest in Syria in order to 
further their own hegemonic agenda in the region. Then the civil war quickly 
become submerged in the struggle against extreme militant Sunni groups and the 
emergence on the scene of ISIS led to the religious, sectarian ideological element 
dominating the discourse in Tehran. Sacred tasks, like the active protection of the 
Zeynep Shrine and the Shia eschatology, became woven into Iran’s narrative on the 
Syrian crisis. Iran may have tried to not be dominated by a sectarian agenda, but 
the unapologetically religious position on the active defense of Shi‘a holy sites in 
Syria and also with the recruiting of Shi‘a ground troops, Iran’s foreign policy 
clearly became driven more and more by religious ideology or at least this is the 
perception that has increased and become hard to shake off. 
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 Initially, Iran did its uppermost to save the Syrian regime, and Iranian 
support for the Assad regime has been the key to its survival through all the massive 
challenges of the Syrian War. Without such a geopolitically vital ally, The Iranian 
Republic would be severely exposed. So, in order to support its ally, Iran has taken 
on very thorough, expensive, and integrated efforts on many levels. The support 
that Syria received from Iran in 2012 started to increase significantly, and in early 
2013 when Assad lost much of his land to opposition militants, Iran provided Assad 
financial (credit lines, oil and gas supplies and military funding), direct and indirect 
military assistance.  
            At the start of the Syrian uprisings, the reformist’s camp was initially critical 
about Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khamenei's support for the Syrian regime. The 
regime in Iran believes it has the right to step in and rescue Assad and has deployed 
most of its elite military forces including IRGC-QF and IRGC-GF under the direct 
command of the charismatic commander of its Quds forces General Qasim 
Suleimani. Even at a devastating cost with huge losses and economic woes, Iran’s 
engagement in Syria has been successful, and Assad is on top against the rebels and 
regaining his previously lost territories. For its efforts in support of the Assad 
regime, Iran and the IRGC will impose their agenda in the region, behind all their 
economic and military activities, they see their role as expanding the Iranian 
revolutionary into Syria and increasing the realm of Shia supremacy spearheaded 
by the Ayatollah. However, the course of events in Syria took a considerable twist 
when the reformists in Iran won the election in May 2013. With this phase of the 
crisis also came the rise of ISIS, which spread its presence in Syria. ISIS changed 
the dynamics of the situation, forcing the US and Europe to recalibrate their 
priorities. Where in the first phase, US policies aimed at regime change, in the 
second phase, the US focused on the fight against ISIS instead. All parties involved 
in the Syrian conflict at this stage took a change in their strategy, such was the 
impact for ISIS. 
Rouhani’s coming to the office only modified Iranian foreign policy’s 
approach on Syria but without any big changes. Tehran continued siding with 
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Damascus, warning the international community against any type of military 
intervention seeking its influence over the country. The arrival of the reformist 
Rouhani did somewhat soften the atmosphere, increasing the hope of a positive 
effort for peace, but however, not much hope was to be found in changing the 
Iranian policy toward Syria War. Therefore, it can be stated that the war in Syria 
has served as an event to test the power balance between the hardliners and 
reformists factions in Iran. Hence, it is believed that the Syrian crisis is the one of 
the most revealing in modern Iranian history. The crisis heightened debate of both 
camps with the hardliners saying that the Islamic Republic of Iran has a strategic 
duty in Syria and must play a leading role in the country, while the reformers see 
Iranian involvement in Syria as unwise and have major concerns about being allied 
with the oppressive Assad Regime. The hardliners take the opposite view as 
Assad’s massacring of the protestors is said to have been something that was 
supported and encouraged by the hardliners of Iran.  
However, for the reformists, the flow of events goes against them and 
instead favoring the religious hardliners, especially from the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps (IRGC). Rouhani did see a fairly smooth time in his first six months, 
during which time he made attempts to engage with the international community 
for cooperation in seeking a peaceful solution in Syria. However, worsening 
conditions in the region with the rise of ISIS and rejection from the Geneva peace 
talks proved to be the catalysts for the IRGC and Hardliners to pounce on Iran’s 
Syria policy, driving it in a more hardline militant direction. 
Therefore, it can be observed that there are quite substantial limits to the 
power of a President in Iran. Rouhani clearly had a vision for Iran’s approach 
toward the Syrian crisis which may have valuable, but he was rendered virtually 
obsolete by the conservative religious factions within the country. The core element 
in the shaping of both domestic politics in Iran has been the grip that the Hardliners 
and the IRGC have on power, which has been revived through their engagement in 
Syria. Therefore, it was clear that the policy on Syria was not being dictated by the 
president or his foreign minister Javad Zarif. 
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            To conclude, the recent events in the region and the empowerment of the 
Hardliners and the IRGC, all show that the Syrian crisis became a watershed 
moment for Iran’s alliance with Syria, and it had a great impact on the internal 
power configuration in Iran, playing right into the hands of the hardliners and 
leaving the reformists stranded.  
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